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5 
Problems and Conclusions 
Is the Fethullah Gülen Movement 
Overstretching Itself? 
A Turkish Religious Community as a National and 
International Player 
The movement led by Turkish preacher Fethullah 
Gülen divides opinions in Germany as forcefully as 
perhaps no other. The Gülen movement is simul-
taneously regarded as the fastest-growing religious 
trend among citizens with Turkish backgrounds in 
Western European countries, including Germany, 
where approximately 300 organisations close to Gülen 
operate 24 state-approved private schools and around 
150 extracurricular tuition centres. Officially, Islamic 
instruction is not provided at any of these establish-
ments. Graduates of these schools form a new – in 
socio moral terms – conservative educational elite 
which is deeply committed to founding further edu-
cational institutions and seeks to establish ties with 
political and administrative bodies and the general 
public in the process. 
In Turkey, Gülen’s supporters currently form the 
largest group of non-governmentally organised fol-
lowers of Islam. Opinions of the movement within 
Turkey also differ widely. Secularists and Kurdish 
nationalists impute to it a totalitarian slant allegedly 
based on a blend of conservative Islam and ethnic 
Turkish nationalism, and accuse it of infiltrating state 
bureaucracy, particularly the police force and the judi-
ciary. Fethullah Gülen himself has lived in the USA 
since 1999, a fact which, for some in Turkey, is suffi-
cient proof that he and his supporters defend US 
interests. By contrast, some liberals are convinced that 
the movement’s most conspicuous trait constitutes 
its origins in mainstream Turkish society, while con-
comitantly representing a modernist Islamic religious 
current which reconciles religion with the market 
economy and parliamentarianism. 
Why does the general public in both Turkey and 
Germany find it so difficult to assess the movement in 
a more balanced manner? How is it possible to judge 
the religious character of a movement that does not 
present itself as a religious actor in public but is led 
by an Islamic scholar? How should the religious and 
political bias of a movement whose idol expresses both 
orthodox and reformist sentiments and who represents 
both Turkish nationalist and internationalist positions 
be interpreted and appraised? What unifies a move-
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6 
ment which professes to be nothing more than a series 
of independent education authorities, media holdings, 
companies and trade associations, all of which feel 
motivated and addressed by Gülen’s tenets? And how 
do Gülen’s supporters themselves contribute to the 
deep mistrust with which they are continually con-
fronted? 
On the one hand, Gülen’s followers emanate from 
different societal groups governed by sometimes anti-
thetical political, social and economic constraints to 
act. 
There is, for example, a schooling and educational move-
ment, which aims to create moral, religiously commit-
ted individuals educated simultaneously in line with 
modern standards. Many in Turkey deem the move-
ment’s schools based abroad, which exceed 140, as 
ambassadors to the country and mediators of Turkish 
culture, which is why the educational movement not 
only exhibits Sunni Muslim but also strong Turkish 
national traits. In addition, the movement operates 
an unknown number of cultural centres dedicated to inter-
faith dialogue. This branch of the movement is partic-
ularly vocal in European countries and in the USA, 
where it uses these activities to garner much of its 
positive image. All these endeavours are financed by 
Turkish entrepreneurs, frequently of Anatolian origin, who 
have formed a parent organisation in Turkey under 
the acronym TUSKON (Turkish Confederation of Busi-
nessmen and Industrialists). TUSKON avoids adopting 
a specific political ideology, its statements paint a 
conflict-free picture of Turkish society, and it deliber-
ately refrains from participating in day-to-day political 
discussions. The political involvement of the cliques 
within Turkish bureaucracy which form the fourth strand 
of the movement, particularly in the police force and 
the judiciary, makes them the target for quite differ-
ent judgements. 
Secondly, the way in which the Gülen movement 
is viewed depends in large part on the respective 
observers’ political context and the norms to which 
they subscribe. It follows that Turkish nationalist atti-
tudes are generally judged more positively in Turkey 
itself than in European countries hosting Turkish 
immigrants. Conversely, Fethullah Gülen’s political 
convictions, including his belief in the compatibility 
of Islam and democracy, elicit less approving nods in 
Turkey than they do in the USA, for example. This is 
because, in the eyes of Turkey’s predominantly Mus-
lim society, which has been living within a secular 
political framework for ninety years, Gülen’s position 
constitutes a mere reflection of their daily lives. To the 
US public, however, this type of stance quickly makes 
its exponent a moderniser of Islam. 
In Turkey, the movement’s chief significance lies in 
its contribution to the development of a morally con-
servative counter-elite which is proving instrumental 
in superseding the secular Republic’s Europe-oriented, 
yet authoritarian elite. This process is being accom-
plished in part via educational work among the con-
servative classes. However, the Turkish bureaucracy 
and judiciary, site of merciless turf wars, proves an-
other receptive arena. In the USA, the movement has 
established itself as a Muslim alternative to Islamism 
with a readiness to engage in dialogue, earning it 
benevolent acceptance by influential political circles. 
In Germany and other countries receiving Turkish 
immigrants, the movement is the only Turkish-Mus-
lim organisation which does not focus primarily on 
politics of recognition in regard to Islam. As is the 
case elsewhere, it avoids lobbying for the building 
of mosques and the introduction of Islamic religious 
instruction, concentrating instead on the transfer of 
secular knowledge which a Muslim educational elite 
is required to bring forth. However, this secularisation 
of action goes hand in hand with a powerful internali-
sation of religious norms and values. The Gülen move-
ment’s declared purpose, then, is commensurable 
with the “Inner Mission” in Germany, those chari-
table, Christian organisations and initiatives back in 
the age of industrialisation, whose social commit-
ment was nurtured by religious awareness and simul-
taneously directed at strengthening religious identity. 
Which of these two dynamic strands of the Gülen 
movement will retain the upper hand in Germany, 
and how should the Federal Republic’s state and soci-
ety react to the movement’s activities? 
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7 
The Development of the Fethullah-Gülen Movement in Turkey 
 
Fethullah Gülen and His Movement in the 
Context of Turkish Political Development 
to 1999 
The son of an imam, Fethullah Gülen was (officially)1 
born on 27th April 1941 in Eastern Anatolia in the 
village of Pasinler in the Erzurum province. In 1959, 
Gülen himself became an imam and preacher for the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs (DİB), which sent him 
to the city of Edirne on the Turkish-Bulgarian border. 
In 1962, during his military service, Gülen was ac-
cused of sedition in the city of İskenderun as a result 
of his preaching unofficial sermons, although the 
proceedings were later dropped. After completing 
military service, Gülen returned to Erzurum tem-
porarily. There, he participated in the foundation of 
the local branch of the Association for the Struggle 
against Communism (KMD), a highly nationalist 
organisation allegedly controlled by the Turkish and 
American intelligence agencies during the Cold War.2
In 1964, Gülen resumed his activities as an imam 
and preacher in Edirne. He began to give lectures to a 
small group of followers in one of the city’s mosques. 
A convincing orator, he rapidly made a name for him-
self. Gülen was transferred to the metropolis of Izmir, 
where he was appointed preacher for the Turkish 
Aegean region, an office which enabled him to engage 
in extended preaching and lecture tours. During these 
years, the first residential communities peopled by 
Gülen’s followers were established. 
 
During the same period, Gülen was also involved in 
the local community centre (HE), a partially state-
controlled cultural organisation established during 
the administration of the Kemalist Republican 
People’s Party (CHP). 
 
1  Date of register entry. According to Gülen’s official website, 
the actual year of birth was 1938, http://tr.fgulen.com/ 
content/view/3502/128/ (accessed 13 December 2012). 
2  As stated by political theorist Ahmet İnsel in Human Rights 
Foundation of Turkey, Report 1998 (Istanbul, 1998), 56–58. 
Gülen’s stance on the 1980 Turkish coup d’état 
On 12th March 1971, the Turkish military interrupted 
the parliamentary political process for the second 
time in the history of the Republic.3 The officers who 
spearheaded the coup d’état justified their actions by 
citing the danger of “reactionary religious activities”, 
among other things. Fethullah Gülen was among 
those arrested. He was accused of “exploiting religious 
feelings for self-serving political ends”. Nevertheless, 
Gülen subsequently succeeded in drawing positive 
benefits from the military intervention: “Many left-
wing leaders received their comeuppance. Muslims 
were usually only arrested in order to maintain a type 
of balance [between the persecution of left- and right-
wing factions].”4
In the early seventies, Islamic factions in Turkey 
formed their first political party. Necmettin Erbakan’s 
National Salvation Party (MSP) propagated the cre-
ation of a powerful, independent Turkey whose task it 
was to protect the Muslim peoples from the West and 
lead it in the struggle against the same, as the Otto-
man Empire before it. At the 1973 parliamentary elec-
tions, the MSP spontaneously won 11.8 per cent of the 
votes. Although this figure slipped back to 6.4 per cent 
during the next elections in 1977, the idea that Islam 
offered a viable political alternative had effectively 
established itself. Radical groups no longer considered 
Turkey as a “country of Islam” (dar ul-İslam) instead 
 Gülen was found guilty but swiftly 
released during a subsequent amnesty. He resumed 
preaching as early as February 1972. The number of 
his followers grew, and, in 1978, the Ak Yazılı foun-
dation was established in Izmir under his influence, 
which still exists today. In 1979, the inaugural issue 
of the magazine Sızıntı, for which Gülen penned the 
editorials, was published. The first revision courses 
influenced by Gülen’s teaching and designed to pre-
pare grammar school pupils for the central university 
entrance examination were developed in the same 
period. 
 
3  The first coup d’état, in 1960, ousted the right-wing con-
servative Democratic Party (DP) from power. 
4  Quoted in the daily newspaper Hürriyet, 3 April 1998, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster//haber.aspx?id=-12660& 
yazarid=6 (accessed 21 November 2013). 
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8 
branding it a “country of war” (dar ul-harb) as a result 
of its secular political system. 
During this dispute, Fethullah Gülen aligned itself 
with the ruling system and opposed the direct politici-
sation of Islam. The Muslims’ chief task lay not in the 
fight against a secular state, but in its own ethical and 
moral renewal. In 1977, the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs provided Gülen with an opportunity to preach 
in two of Istanbul’s main mosques. The then prime 
minister Süleyman Demirel and his foreign minister 
Sabri Çağlayangil were the most prominent members 
of the congregation. 
When the generals staged a coup against Demirel’s 
government three years later, on 12th September 
1980, Gülen followed the line established by the lead-
ers of the coup.5
In the editorial of the October 1980 issue of his 
magazine Sızıntı, directly following the coup d’état, 
Fethullah Gülen described Anatolia as “the final 
guard” against the [corrupt] mentality of the crusad-
ers, the Jesuits and also against the poison of lust, alco-
hol and Western philosophies and ideologies.
 
6 Ana-
tolia’s abilities are based on the unswervingly “nation-
alist-religious spirit” of its population. However, Gülen 
went on, the Kemalists had estranged themselves from 
the Muslim Turks. According to Gülen, the military 
intervention would halt this process, which is why it 
would constitute the largest, most important victory by 
Muslim Turks in their entire history. Gülen concludes 
his article with an attempt to legitimise his own move-
ment in the eyes of the military. He writes: “In order 
to free the [religious-] national body from the cancer-
ous ulcer which has been consuming it for years, a 
more deeply grounded movement that comes from 
the bottom of the heart is needed.”7
In the ensuing seventeen years, Gülen’s endorse-
ment of the coup d’état enabled his movement to 
enjoy a relatively large degree of impunity as far as 
monitoring by secular powers was concerned. Between 
1986 and 1997, it even received the active support of 
the respective secular governments. Gülen’s current 
critics view his stance in those days as a genuine ex-
 
 
5  The fact that Gülen’s official website glosses over his justi-
fication of the coup d’état, presenting him exclusively as one 
of its victims, tallies with the image of him the movement 
wishes to convey today, http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/ 
3502/128/ (accessed 13 December 2012). 
6  [Fethullah Gülen], “The Final Guard” (Turkish), Sızıntı, 
October 1980, http://www.sizinti.com.tr/konular/ayrinti/ 
son-karakol.html (accessed 21 November 2013). 
7  Ibid. 
pression of his political position, and believe that the 
more liberal opinions he voices today are mere dis-
semblance. 
Gülen’s early political vision 
Despite his political opposition to Necmettin Erbakan, 
Gülen’s world view in the 1980s and 90s differed only 
very slightly from that of his Islamist adversary and 
the latter’s party. Gülen and Erbakan shared a rejec-
tion of westernisation and all related social norms and 
lifestyles, the condemnation of “Westernisers” in their 
own country, the glorification of the Ottoman Empire 
as a major Turkish-Muslim power and vanguard of the 
Islamic world, hostility towards non-Muslims, particu-
larly Christians, the premise that the Turkish nation is 
unimaginable without Islam, with all the accompany-
ing political extrapolations of this concept of a Nation 
of Religion and – perhaps most significant – the idea 
that the Muslim Turks must be subject to ethical and 
moral renewal. This latter conviction went hand in 
hand with the repudiation of all notions of individual 
freedom and religious and cultural pluralism, which 
naturally included fundamental, and thus also politi-
cal, equality.8
By contrast, what separated Gülen from Erbakan 
and more radical groups at the time was, 
 
1. The idea that the Republican State was primarily 
an instrument of repression which had to be opposed. 
Gülen rejected the rhetorically exaggerated alter-
native propagated by the radical Islamists that Turkey 
could either be a “country of Islam” governed by Mus-
lims, or a “country of war”, in which Muslims were 
repressed. He described Turkey as a “country of ser-
vice” (dar ül-hizmet), in which Muslims were required 
to work for Muslims and contribute to an increase in 
Muslim morality.9 He believed that the State itself 
was too important to be opposed or even destroyed;10
 
8  Cf. Yavuz Çobanoğlu, The Goal of a “Golden Generation”: 
Society, State, Morality and Authority According to Fethullah Gülen 
(Turkish), (Istanbul, 2012), 233–300. 
 
9  Bekim Agai, Between Network and Discourse: The Educational 
Network Surrounding Fethullah Gülen (born 1938): The Flexible Imple-
mentation of Modern Islamic Thought (German), Bonner Islam-
studien, vol. 2 (Schenefeld, 2004), 140. 
10  “So do you have another State? Do not destroy the State 
you have before you have prepared its alternative”, said 
Gülen in a quote published in the daily newspaper Sabah on 
26 January 1995. 
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2. The idea that the conquest of the State by an 
Islamist party and the modification of its institutions 
(system of government and laws) would be sufficient 
to make Islam the dominating societal force. Instead, 
Gülen emphasised how imperative it would be to train 
an elite with the intellectual capacity to govern the 
State and survive in the face of Western competition, 
and which, furthermore, would require an ethical and 
moral grounding sufficient to withstand Western 
temptations; 
3. The idea that a transition of power could only 
be achieved with the support of the population in 
elections or public actions and that, in order to create 
this support, it would be necessary to respond to 
the demands of the devout electorate. Gülen did not 
participate in the debate regarding the stronger or 
weaker presence of Islam in public life, nor on discus-
sions concerning the headscarf, the pilgrimage or the 
state schools for the training of preachers, with the 
result that secular circles ceased to regard him as a 
threat to their Europeanised lifestyles. This led to the 
opinion, more widespread then than now, that the 
Gülen movement was an essentially non-political 
trend.11
However, Gülen’s fundamental convictions at that 
time not only overlapped considerably with those of 
the Islamist movement. They were also largely con-
sistent with the state cultural and educational policies 
implemented in the wake of the coup d’état under 
the rule of the generals, which became known as the 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.
 
12
At the time, the coup’s instigators actually adopted 
significant elements of Gülen’s and Erbakan’s think-
ing, a fact which only appears paradoxical at first 
glance. In order to counter the increasing politicisa-
tion of young people and the influence of right- and, 
even more so, left-wing belief systems, concomitantly 
fencing in political Islam, the generals integrated 
religion within Republican ideology as a further 
identity-establishing element the latter. This process 
can be described as Kemalism in Islamic guise, and 
found expression in a raft of measures, ranging from 
the revision of school books on history and civic edu-
cation and the restructuring of state institutions for 
language and historical policies to the introduction of 
obligatory religious education in schools and the pro-
 
 
11  Cf. here Ömer Laçiner, “Community Politics” (Turkish), 
Birikim 282 (October 2012): 19–25. 
12  Cf. Binnaz Toprak, “Religion as a State Ideology in a Laicist 
State: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (German), Zeitschrift für 
Türkeistudien 2, no. 1 (1989): 55–62. 
liferation of theological university faculties. During 
the course of the State’s ideological realignment, the 
Gülen movement became the civil society equivalent 
of state policy almost by default; certainly by no effort 
of its own. Like the State, the Gülen supporters repre-
sented a combination of national-religious sentiment 
and socio-moral conservatism, and were committed to 
the creation of a strong state, while simultaneously 
opposing the party-political organisation of political 
Islam. 
The broad parallels between his world view and 
the new state ideology, and his concurrent renuncia-
tion of opposition explain why, unlike other religious 
activists, Fethullah Gülen retained a large degree 
of impunity in the wake of the coup d’état, and his 
followers were able to continue their activities. The 
removal of around 100 of Gülen’s disciples from the 
police service in 1982 did not compromise this un-
official collaboration. In the ensuing years, Gülen, 
evidently enjoying the favour of state authorities, 
preached in all the major mosques in Istanbul, in 
Ankara, Izmir and in his home city of Erzurum. 
The appeal and practicality of the Gülen movement 
for the State in the 1980s and 90s 
However, Fethullah Gülen’s influence and popularity 
in Turkey did not reach its peak until the first half of 
the nineties. 
In terms of domestic politics, this was due to the 
renewed growth of the Islamist movement, this time 
in the shape of the Welfare Party (RP), once again 
under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. During 
the local elections in 1994, the Welfare Party won 
nineteen per cent of the vote, capturing the city halls 
of Istanbul, Ankara and a series of other cities with 
up to a twenty-five per cent share. The party emerged 
victorious at the subsequent parliamentary elections 
in December 1995, winning over twenty-one per cent 
of the vote. After months of wrangling over the for-
mation of the government, party chairman Erbakan 
was appointed to lead the resultant two-party coali-
tion as Prime Minister in 1996. The “Islamist threat” 
which some feared would dawn with this develop-
ment made Gülen, the champion of an ostensible 
non-political, alternative Islam, a central figure in 
the public discourse on religion and state legitimacy. 
In the early nineties, new, foreign policy-related 
spheres of activity became accessible to Ankara with 
the emergence of new independent states in the 
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Balkans and Central Asia. For Turkey, relatively un-
prepared for these developments, the Gülen network’s 
private schools proved the most effective instruments 
of foreign cultural and educational policy. Gülen 
founded his first schools based abroad with the sup-
port of the Turkish State, or, more precisely, the 
General Directorate for Services for Education Abroad, 
part of the Ministry of National Education (MEB).13 
Years later, a magazine sympathetic to the movement, 
Aksiyon, published a report on the personal involve-
ment of the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal (died 
April 1993) in the schools inspired by Fethullah Gülen 
in the Balkans and in the Turk republics of the former 
Soviet Union.14
This placed Fethullah Gülen at the centre of do-
mestic and foreign political challenges for the Turkish 
State. He maintained close ties with top-level politi-
cians including Turgut Özal, founder of the Mother-
land Party (ANAP) and who, from 1983–1989 and 
1989–1993, held the offices of Prime Minister and 
President respectively, Tansu Çiller, Chairwoman of 
the True Path Party (DYP) and Prime Minister, and 
even Bülent Ecevit, Chairman of the Democratic Left 
Party (DSP) and four-time Prime Minister, who had 
a reputation as a strictly secular politician. In 1994, 
Fethullah Gülen made the opening speech on the 
occasion of the establishment of the Journalists and 
Writers Foundation (GYV), designed as a vehicle to 
convey his political ideas to those social circles whose 
self-definition was not primarily religious via large-
scale public symposia and other events. In 1997, Gülen 
began to make contact with Christian churches, and 
initiated the first interfaith dialogues. He had an 
audience with Pope John Paul II in February 1998 
within the context of these activities. 
 
However, Gülen and his movement were ostracised 
when the military leadership deemed that the Islamic 
revival, promoted in part by the policies of the gen-
erals since 1980, had reached alarming levels and that 
it was time to launch an uncompromising strike on 
Erbakan’s party and considerably restrict the scope of 
the Islamic civil society. At the National Security Coun-
cil meeting on 28th February 1997, the military staff 
agreed on a coordinated legal, bureaucratic and media 
campaign which resulted in the resignation of the 
 
13   Agai, Between Network and Discourse (see note 9), 156. 
14  Weekly magazine Aksiyon, edition of 16 April 2007, 
http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-18411-26-ozal-bu-
okullar-orta-asyanin-gelecegi.html (accessed 21 November 
2013). 
Erbakan government in June 1997 and the ban on his 
party in January 1998. 
Gülen had always voiced his opposition to Erba-
kan’s policies and, unlike the latter, denied that it was 
a woman’s absolute religious duty to wear a headscarf, 
for example.15 After the aforementioned National 
Security Council meeting with its far-reaching con-
sequences, Gülen pledged his support for the demands 
ultimately issued to the Erbakan government by 
the military.16
Nevertheless, with the Welfare Party’s removal from 
power Gülen lost his central domestic political func-
tion for the ruling elite, and he came under increasing 
public pressure. On 23rd December 1997, Gülen felt 
compelled to offer to hand over 300 private schools 
run by his supporters in Turkey and abroad to the 
Ministry of Education. In June 1999, a press campaign 
was initiated against him in which real or falsified 
recordings of his sermons were used, resulting in 
charges being brought against him. However, Gülen 
had already travelled to the USA for medical treatment 
on 31st March 1999, where he subsequently took up 
residence and still remains. 
 Among other things, the generals 
demanded a restriction on the training of imams and 
preachers, the removal of religious activists from 
public service, a cap on the funding of religious activi-
ties by the private sector and the transfer of private 
schools run by religious authorities to the State. 
In public, Gülen supported all these military orders, 
although they were, in part, directed against the 
schools and foundations his followers had established. 
The previous year, the Journalists and Writers 
Foundation (GYV) had started to organise political 
symposia, operating under the name the “Abant Plat-
form”. These events can be interpreted as the quasi 
civil society response by the Gülen movement to its 
political situation at that time. It was initially con-
cerned with the defence of Muslims’ religious freedom 
within the Secularist State. The symposia placed this 
question at the centre of the general discussion on 
human rights and rule of law in Turkey. Later con-
ferences focused on other topics, including the situa-
tion of minorities and societal pluralism. 
 
15  He voiced this opinion for the first time in an interview 
with Ertuğrul Özkök in the Hürriyet on 23 January 1995, see 
official Gülen website http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/ 
2257/5/ (accessed 13 December 2012). 
16  Agai, Between Network and Discourse (see note 9), 160f. 
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Fethullah Gülen and His Movement within 
the Religious Context of Turkey 
Fethullah Gülen’s contribution to Islamic theology 
has been the subject of enthusiastic appraisals.17 How-
ever, he is no reform theologian who represents views 
on the understanding of the Koran, the words of the 
Prophet (hadith) or his actions (sunnah), which lie out-
side the orthodox Turkish mainstream. Gülen has also 
exercised no influence on Turkish reform theologians 
who approach the Koran from a hermeneutic or his-
torical-critical perspective.18 In some respects, such as 
the question of the position of women, for example, 
he lags behind the stance adopted by the Turkish State 
Presidency of Religious Affairs. Gülen supports the 
Koranic precept according to which testimony given 
by women in court is allegedly worth only half of that 
provided by men,19 while the theologians working for 
the State religious authorities explain their interpre-
tation of the relevant passage, which deviates from its 
precise wording, by arguing that this phrasing is char-
acteristic of the time of the Koran’s revelation and can 
thus only claim relative authority.20
The influence of the Nakşibendiye Order 
 
From a theological perspective, Gülen is part of the 
tradition of the Nakşibendiye (Nahqshbandiya) Order, 
which dates back to Bahaddin Naqshband (1317–
1384). Unlike other mystical fraternities, the Nakşi-
bendiye espouses neither the humility and unworld-
liness of the fakir, nor the relativisation of Koranic 
norms and laws in the name of an direct recognition 
of the Divine.21
 
17  See, for example, Thomas Michel: “It [Gülen’s theology] 
may well prove in the long run to be the area of his deepest 
and most enduring influence”, Thomas Michel, “The Theo-
logical Dimension of the Thought of M. Fethullah Gülen”, 
in Mapping the Gülen Movement. A Multidimensional Approach, 
ed. Gürkan Çelik (Amsterdam, 2010), 57. 
 The Nakşibendiye’s fundamental char-
acteristic is the fear of a gradual dwindling of divine 
18  Cf. Felix Körner, Old Text – New Context: Koran Hermeneutics 
in Contemporary Turkey (German), (Freiburg i. Br., 2006). 
19  Yavuz Çobanoğlu, “A Movement without a Female Arche-
type” (Turkish), Birikim, 282 (October 2012): 77–84, here 81. 
20  Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DİB, Presidency of Religious 
Affairs), Final Declaration by the First Consultative Assembly on Daily 
Religious Problems (Turkish) (Ankara, 18 May 2002). 
21  Şerif Mardin, “The Nakşibendiye Order in Turkish His-
tory”, in Islam in Modern Turkey, ed. Richard Tapper (London, 
1991), 121–44, here 123. 
guidance. The Order’s doctrines are based on the 
premise that the Muslim community has been in 
continual decline since its virtually perfect original 
state at the time of the Prophet. 
According to the Order, the spiritual downfall 
should be mitigated by four attitudes or precepts: 
firstly, by strict observance of the Koranic rules, 
secondly, by the renunciation of an individual search 
for God, to be replaced by active efforts to maintain 
the social community’s, or society’s ethical-moral order, 
thirdly, by the conviction that God sends the Muslims 
a reviver of the faith each century, and, fourthly, 
by the intellectual exercise of being aware of the Crea-
tor’s presence at all times, and the continual willing-
ness to recognise the reflection of divine action in the 
world as we perceive it.22
Where Fethullah Gülen’s religious views become 
socially relevant, the stances he adopts read like a 
modernised version of these four principles of Nakşi-
bendic doctrine. 
 
Initially, then, Gülen rejects all metaphorical inter-
pretation of the Koran and the relativisation of its 
rules. He cleaves, instead, to the direct validity of 
the Koranic text – as in his position on the issue of 
women’s rights.23 Secondly, like the Nakşibendiye 
Order, Gülen also negates the possibility of believers 
taking an individual path to an understanding of God. 
In his view, belief is fulfilled primarily by active work 
for the preservation of the community’s socio-moral 
order. Just as the ritual precepts (ritual prayer, pil-
grimage, charity etc.) are non-negotiable religious 
duties, Gülen also believes that maintaining the well-
being of not only the family, but also of the commu-
nity, constitutes a religious obligation. In Gülen’s eyes, 
“Islam is at the heart of a future society whose norms 
and moral concepts are prescribed by religion, in 
the name of which those with the requisite authority 
advocate benevolence and prevent malevolence.”24
 
22  Ibid., 123ff. 
 
Thirdly, within this framework, the moral community 
controls the individual, and the individual achieves 
divine salvation via his or her active dedication to the 
other members of the same community. Against the 
background of the above mentioned rejection of an in-
23  Paradoxically, this is also recognised by those who pre-
sent Gülen as a reform theologian: “The emphasis that Gülen 
places on Qur’an and sunna underlines the ‘orthodox’ nature 
of Gülen’s teaching and the community’s practice”, Michel, 
“The Theological Dimension of the Thought of M. Fethullah 
Gülen” (see note 17), 59. 
24  Çobanoğlu, The Goal of a “Golden Generation” (see note 8), 72. 
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dividual quest for God lies the rejection of individual 
lifestyles. The more homogeneous a community, the 
stronger it is. Individualism is, by contrast, the first 
step towards the weakening of that community.25 
In his writings penned in Turkey, Gülen refers to his 
followers as “recruits”, as “soldiers not in shape, but 
in spirit”, and as a “cavalry of light” against the dark-
ness.26 The teaching’s adepts are required to submit 
voluntarily to the spiritual leader. This leader is Gülen 
himself.27 The fourth noteworthy feature of the Nakşi-
bendiye principles, namely the continual realisation 
of God and the contemplation of the world as a direct 
mirror of divine action, is the part of the teachings 
which has undergone the most radical change within 
the context of its adaptation to the modern age. This 
significant acceleration of the doctrine’s modernisa-
tion can be attributed not to Fethullah Gülen, but to 
Said-i Nursi (also Said-i Kurdi = the Kurdish Said), who 
lived between 1876 and 1960 and was venerated by his 
followers as “The Wonder of the Age” (Bediüzzaman).28
The influence of Said-i Nursi 
 
The age in which Nursi created his theological canon 
was marked by the rigid secularisation policies of the 
Kemalist regime. The transfer of religious knowledge, 
traditions and practices was subject to numerous 
restrictions, and a new secular elite, trained at Euro-
pean (or Europeanised) universities regarded the 
religious wisdom with contempt. The Nakşibendiye 
Order’s traditional endeavours to uphold the commu-
nity’s morals receded into the background during the 
Nursi era, as, for him, the future of religion itself was 
at stake. Scientific principles had spawned new ideol-
ogies such as materialism, positivism and Darwinism, 
whose patterns of thinking and explanation threat-
ened to deprive religion of its role as interpreter of the 
world. 
In the light of this, Nursi applied the Nakşiben-
diye’s mental exercise of becoming aware of the Crea-
tor’s presence by viewing the world as a reflection of 
 
25  Kıvanç Koçak, “Gülen and Totalitarianism: Authoritar-
ianism, Military Order and Discipline” (Turkish), Birikim 282 
(October 2012): 49. 
26  Quoted in ibid., 5. 
27  Cf. Cemalettin Canlı, “A Delicate Connection: Nurism and 
Fethullah Gülen” (Turkish), Birikim 282 (October 2012): 89ff. 
28  Regarding Nursi’s biography, cf. Şükran Vahide, “The Life 
and Times of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi”, The Muslim World 89, 
no. 3–4 (July–October 1999): 208–44. 
his actions to natural phenomena. In this way, he 
attempted to integrate the results of modern science 
into a conception of the world. He divided creation 
into things immediately observable by the naked eye 
(nature as it appears to us) on the one hand and, on 
the other, an underlying divine design, whose inner 
structure included all natural objects and determined 
their functionality.29
Said-i Nursi’s writings initiated a completely new 
movement among Turkish Muslims. Study groups 
reminiscent of Bible study groups, which sought to 
understand the Koran anew in the light of modern 
science with the aid of Nursi’s writings, sprang up 
all over the country. Steeled by this type of religious 
argumentation, the next generation was able to open 
itself to the sciences and the secular school system 
without endangering its beliefs. 
 He believed that this divine 
design can be studied by exploring nature. Nursi used 
an allegory to describe nature as the second divine 
book which, like the Koran, delivered insights into 
the Creator. With this, the study and exploration of 
nature became a religious duty. 
Nursi also broke new ground in a political sense. 
He was one of the few religious scholars of his time 
to view constitutionalism and its associated ideas of 
participatory and democratic rule as being compatible 
with Islam.30
 
29  Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: 
The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Albany, NY, 1989), 213. With 
this, Nursi became the first Muslim to develop a concrete con-
ception of what is now known as intelligent design. 
 In 1909, Nursi welcomed the reinstate-
ment of the Ottoman Constitution, and, when the 
election victory by the Democratic Party (DP) in 1950 
signalled the irrevocable end of the era of one-party 
rule and tentative steps towards democratisation were 
taken, Nursi sent the new State President Celal Bayar 
a congratulatory telegram. Even after the religious 
leader’s death, his followers continued to support the 
parties of the Central Right, which they deemed the 
sole alternatives to the secularist-nationalist and State-
oriented Republican People’s Party (CHP), thus up-
holding Nursi’s commitment to democratic forms 
of government. Nursi’s political stance also proposed 
a perspective of Christianity as a religion equally 
threatened by secularisation, an innovative notion for 
Turkish Muslims which provided them with a new 
outlook on “the West” as a whole. Nursi differentiated 
30  Cf. Yusuf Tekin and Birol Akgün, “The Historical Develop-
ment of the Islamists’ Relationship with Democracy” (Turk-
ish), in Political Intellectual History of Modern Turkey, vol. 6: Islam-
ism (Turkish), (Istanbul, 2004), 652–63. 
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between a positive and a negative Europe, drawing 
the line between the two in accordance with the space 
accorded to religion within the European states. As 
this was largely dependent on the form of govern-
ment, he viewed countries with parliamentary rule 
as potential allies, and the Eastern bloc states, by 
contrast, as representatives of the “negative” Europe. 
Nursi described Christians who shared his opposition 
to materialism and Communism as “Muslim-Chris-
tians”.31
In all aspects of the Gülen movement recognised 
as positive by the German and international public, 
Fethullah Gülen stands on Nursi’s shoulders. Nursi 
created the intellectual rationale for the compatibility 
of Islam with modern sciences. Departing from the 
then Muslim mainstream, he endorsed the religious 
justification of participatory and democratic forms of 
government. He broke down the strict fraternal struc-
ture typical of that era, instead creating an open, yet 
effective organisational form in the shape of his study 
groups. Moreover, he was the first person to draw 
attention to a possible synchronisation of the interests 
of Christians and Muslims in their rivalry with secular 
or secularist explanatory models of the world. 
 
However, Gülen initially adopted these progressive, 
unorthodox elements of Nursi’s thought only hesitant-
ly and without referring to the latter directly.32 He 
repeatedly repudiated the label Nurcu (Nurist) when 
applied to himself.33
Gülen’s reluctance to commit to Nursi is under-
standable, as, although he adopts the latter’s “meth-
od”, he modifies the thrust of the latter’s activities. 
 And even when his followers 
later invoked Nursi, this occurred only in a very gen-
eral manner and without giving explicit credence to 
Nursi’s ideas. In the daily life of Gülen’s companions, 
the latter’s writings eclipse the canon of Nursi, the 
“Risale-i Nur”, or “Treatises of the Light”. 
On a social, societal and political level, Nursi was 
concerned with promoting solidarity amongst his 
readership and community of disciples in a period of 
continual persecutions, prohibitions, confiscation of 
written works, arbitrary arrests and numerous show 
trials. Nursi was preoccupied with the continued exis-
tence of religion. Fethullah Gülen, on the other hand, 
has set himself the task of restoring Muslim ethics and 
morals and accumulating sufficient backing for his 
 
31  Ergün Yıldırım, The New Players in the New Turkey: The AKP 
and the Gülen Community (Turkish), (Istanbul, 2011), 198. 
32  Canlı, “A Delicate Connection” (see note 27), 87–91. 
33  Agai, Between Network and Discourse (see note 9), 157. 
vision of a Muslim society. His chief concern is not the 
continuance of religion, but instead the grooming of 
a devout elite intended to function as the main tool in 
the construction of a new society. 
Nursi had not only experienced the authoritarian 
rule of the earlier Republic, but also witnessed the 
severe crises which gripped state and society in the 
Ottoman Empire. He was fully aware of the weakness 
of the Empire and its institutions, which is precisely 
why he directed his hopes at political freedom and 
progress. By contrast, Gülen joins the contemporary 
Muslim-conservative mainstream in idealising the 
Ottoman Empire. 
Nursi, the Kurd who experienced the early Repub-
lic’s Turkish nationalist agenda, together with its 
secularism, as repressive, not only championed liberal 
forms of government, but also, unlike the Turkish 
nationalists, sought orientation in line with the guid-
ing principle of Ummah, the transnational commu-
nity of Muslims.34 For Gülen, on the other hand, the 
Turk born long afterwards, who spent his formative 
years in the nationalist climate of the early Turkey, 
the concept of “nation” forms an integral part of his 
view of Islam. Following the ultra-ideologised Turkish 
History Thesis, taught in the early Republic, Gülen 
establishes as a fact the superiority of Turkish culture 
and, with this, Turkish Islam over forms of Islam prac-
tised by other nations.35 At times, in fact, the impres-
sion is created that, for Gülen, religion is there to 
serve the nation and that the latter is by no means 
deemed one of several political forms of organisation. 
In his early writings, Gülen expressed open hostility 
towards all those who, in his opinion, posed a threat 
to the inner unity of state and nation, primarily the 
Kurds and Kurdish-speaking Alevis.36
 
34  Hakan M. Yavuz, “The Assassination of Collective Memory: 
The Case of Turkey”, The Muslim World 89, no. 3–4 (July–Octo-
ber 1999): 193–207, here 195. 
 
35  This is also conceded by pro-Gülen academics. However, 
they attempt to place a positive slant on it, cf. Doğu Ergil, 
“Anatomy of the Gülen Philosophy and Movement”, in Map-
ping the Gülen Movement, ed. Çelik (see note 17), here 23–25. 
36  During these years, Gülen avoided the designation 
“Kurds”. In the new edition of the writings of Said-i Nursi, 
which are published by companies close to Gülen, the terms 
“Kurds” and “Kurdistan” are replaced by “Easterners”, “the 
East” and “eastern provinces”. Gülen describes Kurdish-speak-
ing Alevis as the descendants of merely superficially islam-
ised Armenians and Assyrians whose beliefs do not constitute 
an authentic religion; see Ayşe Hür in the daily newspaper 
Taraf of 11 December 2011. 
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The Fethullah Gülen Movement in the Con-
text of Turkey’s Socio-structural Development 
Although the manner in which the Fethullah Gülen 
movement, its emergence and evolution, are entan-
gled within Turkey’s political development and the 
interpretation of its religious foundations elucidates 
the network’s political and religious orientation, it 
does not explain the movement’s exponential growth 
in the last twenty years. And, despite the fact that its 
toleration by the military government in the early 
1980s, nurturing by the secular governments in the 
1990s and subsequent cooperation with the AKP (Jus-
tice and Development Party) in the following decade 
aided its expansion considerably, this does not ac-
count for the dynamic it has developed. That said, 
however, it is indeed the political sphere which holds 
the key to explaining the movement’s success. The 
Fethullah Gülen movement grew in parallel with the 
visibility of Islam in politics, i.e. the success of Islamist 
parties such as the MSP, RP, FP (Virtue Party), SP (Felic-
ity Party) and, later on, the Muslim-conservative AKP. 
At the time of the Republic’s foundation in 1923, 
less than ten per cent of the population lived in cities. 
Today, this figure has risen to almost eighty per cent. 
The imposition of a Western lifestyle and the margin-
alisation of religion by the Kemalist elite created a 
deep cultural divide between the rural population and 
the urban middle classes, which was made manifest 
in virtually all aspects of everyday life, ranging from 
dress to linguistic usage, daily routine and political 
loyalties. The rather radical attitude espoused by the 
Islamist movement in the seventies, eighties and nine-
ties was a response to the social marginalisation of 
their supporters, chief among whom, in the seventies, 
were inhabitants of underdeveloped provinces and, 
in the nineties, those who had fled the countryside 
to settle in the major metropolises. People turned 
against the secular Republic, demanded an economy 
without a system of interest, the withdrawal from 
NATO and even toyed with the idea of founding an 
Islamic State. By contrast, the current situation is 
characterised by the integration of social climbers 
from these classes (now in the majority in the fast-
growing cities) within educational institutions, the 
State bureaucracy, the economy and politics. 
For ever-expanding sections of society, then, this 
social upheaval effectively equated Fethullah Gülen’s 
decision to focus his efforts on raising the education 
level of the devout population as opposed to the orga-
nisation of religious life and carrying out political 
work against the Republic with a functional orienta-
tion for the life plan of these individuals. In contem-
porary Turkey, large social groups are faced with the 
task of reconciling their traditional religious identity 
with the challenges posed by new living environments. 
Teachers and students within the educational net-
work, their sponsors – predominantly entrepreneurs 
from Anatolia – and civil servants from the lower 
and/or provincial classes discover in Gülen’s teachings 
a strategy which allows them to expand their profes-
sional and social milieus and yet remain Muslims at 
the same time. Still more, Gülen’s beliefs allow them 
all to combine their personal educational success and 
increased social status with their faith and the inter-
ests of their nation in a legitimate manner. 
With this, the Gülen movement marks a provisional 
hiatus in the Republic’s far-reaching socio-structural 
reorganisation. However, this not only applies to the 
latter, but also to the current ruling party AKP, which, 
in many respects, constitutes the political counterpart 
of the civil society-based Gülen movement. 
Social and political parallels with today’s 
ruling party 
Both forces, the AKP and the Gülen movement, testify 
to the fact that a Muslim middle and upper class has 
emerged or is in the process of emerging, which no 
longer seeks political confrontation with the Kemalist 
state, but desires instead to integrate its followers 
within existing state-based and economic structures, 
gradually reconstructing state and society in the pro-
cess. They both have confidence in the economic 
dynamics unleashed by the Muslim-conservative popu-
lation, and the ruling party and the Gülen group can 
now lean on a newly-created Muslim entrepreneurship 
as a result. Both powers have spawned their own edu-
cational elites, albeit to differing degrees, whereby the 
AKP relies more heavily on the old explicitly Islamist 
cadres. The world view espoused by both movements 
combines Muslim ethics and morality with Turkish-
national sentiment, while their discourse is character-
ised by an awareness of Turkey’s innate strength, and 
both share the vision of expanding their country’s 
influence in the region and worldwide. Additionally, 
both entrust Turkey with a mission to be carried out 
in the entire region and far beyond its borders, name-
ly acting as a counterweight to a Western influence, 
however interpreted, be this in terms of geopolitics 
(the AKP) or on the level of ethical-moral values and 
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social ideals (the Gülen community). At the same time, 
the two organisations exemplify the sheer mutability 
of the religious, social-conservative milieu. 
However, the activities of the Gülen movement 
are not limited to the preparation of the faithful for 
modernity in the form of secular education and to 
bolstering their Muslim identity via service to the 
Muslim-Turkish community. Gülen and his followers 
simultaneously see themselves as the upholders of 
conservative ethics and morality. This facet of the 
movement triggers criticism and concerns among its 
opponents, because the aim of asserting conservative 
moral ideals is concurrently stated as an Islamic 
command and prerequisite for the nation, and thus 
expressed to the individual in an almost totalitarian 
manner, for Gülen’s minions an aspect which gives 
the movement even more appeal. 
The disintegration of traditional social structures 
during the course of urbanisation results in the loss 
of both the protective and punitive collective of the 
village, the self-contained district and the non-indus-
trial guilds. As a result, individuals lack direct social 
control in their new environment, and are simultane-
ously confronted by phenomena including alcohol 
abuse, neglect, crime and “loose morals”, which they 
experience as anomie, lawlessness and social fragmen-
tation. In the eyes of those who subscribe to a tradi-
tional morality, the strengthening of moral rules and 
the consolidation of religious awareness are synony-
mous concepts. As a new community of believers 
based on voluntary action, the Gülen movement and 
its institutions resume the erstwhile direct social 
control, which, coupled with a strengthening of faith, 
is designed to provoke the internalisation of ethical-
moral norms and approaches. In the sense that it 
seeks to stabilise morality and religious commitment 
in the face of a modernisation-induced crisis, the 
Gülen movement recalls the re-Christianisation move-
ment in Germany in the era of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, whose name says it all: Inner Mission.37
This reveals a further parallel between the Fethul-
lah Gülen movement and the current ruling party. 
Even its chairman, Prime Minister Erdoğan, is con-
cerned that Turkey’s young generation could grow 
up to be too secular. As a result, one of the central 
goals of the Erdoğan government is to raise a “devout 
 
 
37  On the Inner Mission, cf. Thomas Olk and Rolf G. Heinze, 
“The Bureaucratisation of Benevolence: the Example of the 
History and Development of the ‘Inner Mission’” (German), 
in Christoph Sachße and Florian Tennstedt, Jahrbuch der Sozial-
arbeit 4 (Reinbek, 1981): 233–71. 
youth”,38 and it has aligned teaching in state schools 
accordingly. The AKP also views the moral state of soci-
ety as a whole as problematic, and attempts to coun-
teract the trend of “depravation” it perceives in public 
life via a manipulation of educational, cultural, media 
and fiscal policies. The party veils its dedication to 
this issue beneath the motto of “service” to the nation, 
employing the same term for this (hizmet) as the Gülen 
movement.39
The fact that the Fethullah Gülen community, like 
the AKP, enjoys such a high degree of popularity thus 
reflects the most important pan-societal trend in con-
temporary Turkey, a trend which exists independently 
of the movement and would find expression in a civil 
society and political sense even if the Fethullah Gülen 
movement did not exist in its present form. 
 
The Fethullah Gülen Movement and Turkey’s 
Current Domestic Policy 
The government’s struggle against 
military intervention 
A distinction between “the government” and “the 
State” was long upheld in Turkish discussions regard-
ing domestic policy. This differentiation established 
itself with the demise of the one-party system in 1950, 
when the Democratic Party (DP) won a landslide elec-
tion victory and banished the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP), dominant until that time, to the ranks of 
the opposition. However, the military, bureaucratic 
and economic elite, the majority of university profes-
sors and the judiciary continued to lend the CHP their 
support. This power bloc was dubbed “the State” by 
the public and media alike. Until the 2000s, the cen-
tral right governments supported by the majority of 
the population were always governments at the mercy 
of this “State”. In 1960, 1971 and 1980, the military 
intervened, each time forcing right-wing conservative 
governments to resign. In 1997, the military remained 
in its barracks, but nonetheless subjected Necmettin 
Erbakan’s Islamist government to such a degree of 
political pressure that it was forced to throw in the 
towel a few months later. 
 
38  News website Haber Türk, 1 February 2012, http://www. 
haberturk.com/gundem/haber/711672-dindar-bir-genclik-
yetistirmek-istiyoruz (accessed 1 February 2012). 
39  Tanıl Bora, “‘Service’ as Actor and Activity within the 
Ideological Discourse of Gülenism” (Turkish), Birikim, 282 
(October 2012): 36. 
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Immediately after the AKP took office in 2002, 
groups of officers in the general staff resumed prepa-
rations for an intervention which was, however, 
delayed repeatedly. On 27 April 2007, the general 
staff published a memorandum with which it wished 
to prevent the election of the then foreign minister 
Abdullah Gül to State President. Just two days later, 
the constitutional court annulled Gül’s formal elec-
tion by the parliament. On 14 March 2008, the public 
prosecutor at the court of cassation initiated legal 
proceedings concerning a ban on the AKP, which had 
succeeded in increasing its share of the vote to almost 
47 per cent during early elections in June of the pre-
vious year.40
The raid on an illegal weapons stockpile by the 
police on 12 June 2007 was the starting shot for 
the government’s counter-offensive. In several waves, 
criminals and nationalists prepared to resort to vio-
lence were initially arrested, who had been used by 
military circles for undercover operations. Next, it was 
the turn of NGOs and journalists close to the military, 
followed by the subsequent detention of former, and 
then active lower-ranking officers. Finally, high-rank-
ing former generals and officers in active service 
and the former chief of staff himself were arraigned 
when the military’s public image had already suffered 
serious damage. In all cases, those concerned were 
accused of planning to overthrow the government and 
of masterminding terror attacks in preparation for 
the same. The criminal proceedings were styled the 
Ergenekon trials and held within the framework of 
anti-terror legislation. 
 
Using a vast arsenal of measures, which included 
the revelation of countless classified military docu-
ments regarding planned coups d’état and undercover 
actions, continuous waves of arrests, thousands of 
pages of endlessly rambling indictments and court 
proceedings which dragged on for years and which 
necessitated the construction of a purpose-built penal 
institution with integrated hearing rooms on the out-
skirts of Istanbul, the government succeeded in intimi-
dating the military and putting it in its place so that 
a coup could be largely excluded for the first time in 
Turkey’s history. 
The trial which had the most far-reaching conse-
quences for the military was the one instigated 
against former and active officers and nicknamed 
 
40  Although the constitutional court rejected this applica-
tion, it did deprive the AKP of a proportion of the state party 
financing.  
“sledge hammer” (Balyoz). A total of 365 people, the 
majority members of the military, were indicted. 250 
of these were remanded in custody during the trial. In 
September 2012, prison sentences of between 16 and 
20 years were handed down against 297 defendants at 
first instance, including eleven former four-star gen-
erals41
This occurred despite the fact that the evidence 
used was peppered with material errors which suggest 
the subsequent fabrication of incriminating docu-
ments.
 In October 2013, the court of cassation unani-
mously confirmed the large majority of the convic-
tions. 
42 The decision by the court of cassation to pe-
nalise the mere act of preparing a criminal offence, i.e. 
the drawing up of plans to stage coups and terrorist 
attacks which precedes any concrete attempts at the 
same, also met with criticism.43 However, more seri-
ously, the indictments for the various trials allege, 
or fabricate, the existence of a terrorist organisation 
(known as Ergenekon). This not only resulted in a 
vast number of independent actions and offences by 
various groups and individuals of a similar persuasion 
being treated as a self-contained terror network, but 
enabled the charges to be heard before special courts 
which dispensed justice in line with the anti-terror 
legislation. This strategy was exaggerated to the point 
of absurdity with the conviction of İlker Başbuğ, for-
mer Chief of Staff, as the leading member of a terror-
ist organisation.44
All these trials were performed in the name of the 
protection of the elected government, the rule of law 
and democracy, and were welcomed as historical pro-
gress by liberal and conservative forces alike. How-
ever, the campaign was, simultaneously, the work of 
a police force and judiciary that until that point, had 
not distinguished itself as a staunch supporter of the 
 For, as Commander-in-Chief of the 
Turkish military, whose predilection for coups d’état 
is beyond dispute, the Chief of Staff has no need to 
take recourse to a secret organisation to carry out anti-
governmental activities. 
 
41  Günter Seufert, “Turkey” (German), in Jahrbuch der Euro-
päischen Integration 2012, ed. Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang 
Wessels (Baden-Baden, 2012): 538. 
42  “An Analysis of the Sledgehammer Trial” (Turkish), Bianet 
(online), http://bianet.org/bianet/hukuk/140996-balyoz-davasi-
nedir (accessed 14 November 2013). Bianet is an independent 
news website. 
43  German criminal law includes similar provisions, see for 
example Paragraph 83 StGB (German Criminal Code), regard-
ing the planning of a treasonous undertaking. 
44  During the so-called first Ergenekon trial, the appeals pro-
cedure is still continuing. 
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rule of law and whose previous operations had always 
been politicised or dominated by vested interests. 
The alliance between the Gülen movement and 
the AKP 
During the course of this struggle, the Fethullah 
Gülen movement opposed the powers of the “State” 
and displayed sympathy with the AKP for the first 
time. This alliance was created on the grounds that 
the AKP’s leadership, which had formerly espoused 
an Islamist ideology, had renounced the ideas of its 
former leader, Necmettin Erbakan, and drawn closer 
to the Gülen line of a long-term policy to rebuild state 
and society. The immediate reason for Gülen’s side-
swapping was, however, the fact that his organisation 
had been targeted by “the State” since 1997. As was 
only subsequently revealed, the military had been 
planning a series of undercover actions designed to 
portray the movement as a terrorist organisation, so 
that an even harder crackdown could take place.45
The support of the Gülen movement was of prime 
importance to the AKP. As the network had relin-
quished an ostentatious display of religious identity, 
but also because Gülen had been an erstwhile collabo-
rator with the State, followers of the movement had 
succeeded in establishing networks in the bureauc-
racy,
 
46 chiefly in the police force and judiciary, but 
also in the military, in the early 1990s, this despite 
several series of government-orchestrated purges. AKP 
party members had only limited success with similar 
endeavours, as, until the end of his term in office in 
2007, the former State President Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
had prevented AKP cadres from being appointed to 
leading official posts. As a result, the following assess-
ment by Turkish journalist Ali Bayramoğlu should be 
endorsed in full: “In its dispute with the military, the 
judiciary and the universities, the AKP had recourse to 
no other instrument than to this network created by 
the [Gülen] movement within the police force, which 
had been formed by the latter for the purpose of 
undermining the power of the military [within the 
State] in order to protect itself.”47
 
45  Cf. the publication of internal documents from the office 
of the general staff in the daily newspaper Taraf on 1 Novem-
ber 2009. 
 
46  Cf. Ali Bayramoğlu, “A Demand for Critical Discussion of 
and Transparency by the Gülen Community” (Turkish), Taraf, 
4 October 2010. 
47  Ali Bayramoğlu, in Radikal, 22 February 2012. 
Various sources indeed describe the systematic for-
mation of cadres within the security forces by Gülen 
followers from around the year 2000 onwards.48 
Spokespeople for the movement defend this strategy 
by emphasising that, in the face of a lack of legal secu-
rity, Muslim groups were left with no choice but to in-
filtrate the bureaucracy and thereby influence state 
authority. “People will only cease to fear the State when 
sufficient numbers have found a place there and can 
proclaim, ‘this is my State’”.49
In 2003 and 2004, then, internet sites sympathetic 
to the Gülen movement also published reports regard-
ing coup plans within the military for the first time.
 
50 
Pro-government journalists have not hesitated to 
acknowledge the movement’s merits in the struggle 
against the “Ergenekon conspiracy”. “It is no secret 
that the Gülen movement has carved out a more or 
less firm position for itself within the police force. 
However, it would be wrong to ascribe the group’s cur-
rent position at the vanguard of both the bureaucracy 
and police force solely to its internal cohesion. We 
must not forget the success of these cadres as far as 
the investigations into Ergenekon and the attendant 
criminal trials is concerned.”51
Left-liberal members of the judiciary go even fur-
ther, claiming that the strategy according to which 
the Ergenekon trials were pursued was developed by 
Gülen movement cadres within the police force from 
2006 onwards.
 
52
 
48  A series of journalistic publications lists internal docu-
ments from the Turkish intelligence agency regarding the 
systematic organisation of Gülen supporters within the bu-
reaucracy. However, the reliability of these reports is often 
questionable, as they always also serve as vehicles for the 
power struggle within the bureaucracy itself, cf., for example, 
Nedim Şener, The Fethullah Gülen Community in the Documents of 
the Ergenekon Trials (Turkish), Istanbul 2010. 
 They allege that the line of investiga-
tion was always stipulated by the heads of the police 
authorities close to Gülen, as a result of which the 
state prosecutors, who later gained fame as a result 
49  Mustafa Yeşil, “I also asked Hocaefendi [Fehtullah Gülen] 
about the judges [of the movement in the judiciary]” (Turk-
ish), Taraf, 7 May 2012. Alliances on the grounds of mutual 
religious convictions or interests are refused a legal status. As 
a result, they operate in an area of legal uncertainty. This also 
applies particularly to the Sunni majority, which remains 
under the guardianship of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. 
50  Ali Bayramoğlu in the Taraf newspaper of 4 October 2010. 
51  Avni Özgürel, “The Controversy Surrounding the Gülen 
Community” (Turkish), Radikal, 18 February 2012. 
52  Orhan Gazi Ertekin and Frauk Özsoy, Turkisation, Islamisa-
tion, Appointment to the Civil Service: The Relationship between AKP, 
Gülen Community and Judiciary (Turkish), (Ankara, 2013), 47. 
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of the trials, never actually had the proceedings under 
their control.53 Additionally, they claim that, in the 
preceding years, jurists sympathetic to the Gülen 
movement had organised themselves in the special 
courts (ÖYM), which were responsible for matters of 
crime against the state and terrorist-related cases, and 
whose prosecutors had extended powers of attorney 
at their disposal.54 A pro-movement observer comments 
on the role of the Gülen supporters in the special 
courts and police force as follows: “Some state pros-
ecutors from the devout middle classes are now trying 
their hands at liberalism and using their current 
opportunities to react to the constraints they once 
experienced. The large majority of these individuals 
are members of one and the same community. The 
same applies to the police.”55 The uproar discernible 
in reports by the movement’s media when, in summer 
2012, the government initiated the closure of the spe-
cial courts and the transfer of all pending trials to a 
number of senior criminal courts constitutes a further 
indication of the strong influence of the Gülen sym-
pathisers in the former.56
Although the signs that the Gülen movement delib-
erately positioned certain of its sympathisers in key 
positions within the security forces and judiciary ap-
pear incontrovertible, the assessment of the concrete 
influence these cadres were able to exert, and still 
exercise over the tenor of trials is a matter of some 
dispute. While the religious-conservative faction em-
phasises its generally increased influence on Turkish 
politics, deeming this development a necessary part of 
democratisation and tending to regard the role of the 
Gülen movement in the bureaucracy as a product of 
the same, the secular faction views the Gülen network 
as a clandestine and thus democratically unlawful par-
ticipant in the transition of power. 
 
 
53  Ibid., 48. However, the weak position of the state prosecu-
tors transcends the Ergenekon trials. “There are currently 
no judicial police units attached to prosecution offices. Pros-
ecutors rely on police units working for the Ministry of the 
Interior and have to develop their capacity to guide police 
investigations effectively and keep strict control of police 
activity”, European Commission, Turkey, 2013 Progress Report 
(Brussels, 2013), 46. 
54  Ertekin and Özsoy, Turkisation, Islamisation, Appointment to 
the Civil Service (see note 52), 47. 
55  Ali Bayramoğlu in the daily newspaper Vatan, 23 February 
2012. 
56  Internet discussion platform Ekşi Sözlük, “The Gülen Com-
munity’s Penchant for the Special Courts” (Turkish), https:// 
eksisozluk.com/cemaatin-ozel-yetkili-mahkeme-sevgisi—
3419004 (accessed 15 September 2013). 
A realistic assessment of the significant role played 
by the Gülen supporters must take a series of factors 
into account. First and foremost, Turkish bureaucracy 
has always been a hotbed of rancorous turf wars 
between ideologically, religiously and party-politically 
organised groups, precisely as a result of the restric-
tions imposed on legal and public political debate by 
the Kemalist state ideology.57
The current feud between the Gülen movement 
and the AKP 
 Moreover, the tensions 
between a secular-oriented military and a police force 
sited in a religious-traditional milieu can be traced as 
far back as the late Ottoman Empire, when the mili-
tary officers became upholders of westernisation. 
If one additionally considers the fact that, over the 
course of the last decade, conservative players have 
integrated themselves within the country’s political, 
economic and cultural elite, it is impossible to expect 
the bureaucracy to have remained unaffected by this 
change. All these considerations relativise the role 
of the Gülen cadres within the bureaucracy. Never-
theless, this does not signify that the investigations 
and trials related to the “Ergenekon” organisation 
could have occurred without being controlled largely 
centrally, or without the concerted efforts of colluding 
political networks. For the above mentioned reasons, 
then, only the supporters of the Gülen movement 
would have been available to assume this coordinat-
ing function. As a result, it should be assumed that 
their cadres played a significant role in this turf war, 
a role that was made possible on the grounds that 
their political and socially-moral ideology was shared 
by large portions of civil servants within the security 
forces. 
Fethullah Gülen’s appeal of 1 August 2010 was his 
most unequivocally supportive of the AKP in any polit-
ical question to date. The preacher called on citizens 
to support the referendum to change the constitution 
initiated by the government, which was actually 
passed on 12 September of the same year with a 58 per 
cent majority. According to Gülen, this issue was of 
 
57  This is also unwittingly admitted by precisely those 
authors who emphasise the role of the cadres close to Gülen 
the most vehemently, cf. Ahmet Şık, The Imam’s Army 
(Turkish), http://www.pdfindir.com/ahmet-%C5%9F%C4%B1k-
imam%C4%B1n-ordusu-pdf-1.html (accessed 20 September 
2013). Although the book was banned prior to publication, it 
can be accessed online. 
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such prime importance that “even the dead should be 
called from the graves to cast their votes.”58 This was 
to be the final instance of cooperation between the 
religious leader and the government. The first seeds of 
discontent were sown in June 2010, when Gülen and 
the AKP disagreed over the flotilla designed to breach 
the Israeli naval blockade of the Gaza Strip. The ini-
tiative was led by the IHH, an aid agency close to the 
AKP, and was performed with Ankara’s approval. For-
eign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had glorified the nine 
Turks killed by Israeli soldiers during the storming of 
the lead ship Mavi Marmara as “martyrs”,59 while the 
Turkish government recalled its ambassadors from Tel 
Aviv. Gülen, on the other hand, condemned the cam-
paign in the Wall Street Journal as an unlawful chal-
lenge to Israel’s state authority.60
Firstly, it has been observed that the very network 
of cliques close to Gülen within the security forces, 
the judiciary and other branches of the bureaucratic 
system, which aided the government in its struggle 
against the “Ergenekon conspiracy”, is now being ac-
cused of politicking for the purposes of the move-
ment, i.e. in its own interests. Even observers suppor-
tive of the movement and, these days, rather critical 
of the government state that “Within the State [i.e. its 
bureaucracy], powers exist which elude Erdoğan’s 
control”, referring here to the networks of Gülen sup-
porters.
 However, the move-
ment’s current feud with the AKP far exceeds this 
initial public dispute. Three intricately entwined sets 
of issues are responsible for the current antagonism. 
61
 
58  Daily newspaper Haber Türk, edition of 1 August 2010. 
New statutes regarding the composition and election of 
the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and the 
constitutional court, which were designed to subvert the su-
premacy of the Kemalists within the judiciary, constituted 
the core of the referendum. 
 Erdoğan himself explicitly accused the spe-
cial courts and the state prosecutors employed there 
59  “The Martyrs of the Mavi Marmara” (Turkish), Beyaz Gazete 
(online), 4 April 2013, http://www.beyazgazete.com/video/ 
anahaber/trt-haber-67/2013/04/04/mavi-marmara-sehitleri-
395487.html (accessed 14 November 2013). 
60  Joe Lauria, “Reclusive Turkish Imam Criticizes Gaza 
Flotilla”, The Wall Street Journal (online), 4 June 2010, http:// 
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487040253045
75284721280274694 (accessed 14 November 2013). 
61  Interview by the news website T24 with Turkish journalist 
Cengiz Çandar, 26 November 2012, http://t24.com.tr/haber/ 
cengiz-candar-ortadoguda-sinirlar-degisecek-turkiye-de-buna-
dahil/218234 (accessed 21 November 2013). 
of behaving like a “state within the State”.62 The 
pro-government press openly denounced the Gülen 
movement for allegedly attempting to dominate 
the entire bureaucratic system, thus creating a 
“new guardianship regime” to replace the military, 
so recently deposed by the AKP.63
Secondly, the political visions of the ruling party 
and the Gülen movement now diverge. The dispute 
was ignited primarily over the Kurdish question. In 
September 2011, information regarding secret nego-
tiations between the National Intelligence Organisa-
tion (MİT) and the Union of Communities in Kurdistan 
(KCK)
 
64 some months previously was made public. In 
February 2012, state prosecutors at Istanbul’s special 
courts subpoenaed Hakan Fidan, the undersecretary 
responsible for the Intelligence Agency at the Office 
of the Prime Minister. He was required to respond to 
accusations ranging from “disclosure of secrets to the 
KCK” and “courier service for the organisation” to “col-
laboration with the KCK for the establishment of a 
Kurdish state”.65 Prime Minister Erdoğan had ordered 
the negotiations personally and now saw himself as 
the potential target for a charge of high treason. He 
accused the state prosecutors of exceeding their 
authority and deflected further investigations with 
two emergency measures, namely railroading an 
amendment of the law on intelligence through parlia-
ment just two weeks later, which guaranteed agency 
employees additional penal immunity, and drastically 
reducing the number of special courts in July 2012. 
Additionally, these are now only responsible for pend-
ing cases relating to crimes against the State. This step 
cleared the way for a shake-up of the judges and pros-
ecutors, thus allowing the government to marginalise 
the networks associated with the Gülen movement.66
 
62  Ekşi Sözlük discussion platform, https://eksisozluk.com/ 
recep-tayyip-erdoganin-yargi-elestirisi--3417404 (accessed 
26 September 2013). 
 
63  Cem Küçük in the pro-government daily Yeni Şafak of 
19 June 2013, for example. 
64  The KCK are the result of the reorganisation of the Kur-
distan Workers’ Party (PKK). Today, both terms are used 
synonymously.  
65  “Investigations Against the National Intelligence Agency 
Regarding the KCK” (Turkish), bianet (online), 9 February 2012, 
http&//www.bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/136035-mite-kck-
sorulacak (accessed 21 November 2013). 
66  Simultaneously, a purge of the police force was carried 
out, in the course of which up to 700 senior- and middle-rank-
ing policemen were transferred from Istanbul to the prov-
inces, see Claire Berlinski, “Anatomy of a Power Struggle”, 
The Journal of International Security Affairs 23, no. 2 (2012): 125, 
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Today, the network’s spokespeople reject all respon-
sibility for the state prosecutors’ involvement in 
the KCK affair. They reference recent statements by 
Fethullah Gülen which supposedly demonstrate that 
he is in favour of granting the Kurds larger cultural 
freedoms.67
One indication of this is that, unlike the movement 
had feared,
 However, at the time of the dispute, the 
movement’s press steadfastly defended the investiga-
tions against the head of the Intelligence Agency. As a 
result, the pro-government media continues to portray 
the Gülen movement as a significant obstacle to the 
resolution of the Kurdish question twenty months 
later, although it appears highly doubtful that specific 
political differences really are the prime reason for 
the government’s animosity towards the Gülen move-
ment. 
68 the government has refrained from abol-
ishing the special courts altogether. They not only 
remain responsible for the Ergenekon trials, but also 
for the so-called KCK proceedings. During the latter, 
approximately 2,000 defendants, around 900 of whom 
were remanded in custody, were forced to defend them-
selves against the accusation of being members of a 
terrorist organisation.69
The fact that the government continued to entrust 
the special courts with these trials, whose judgements 
it had criticised repeatedly in the strongest terms, 
grants a profound insight into the balance of power 
and shady tricks prevalent in Turkish politics. Had the 
special courts been abolished completely, the govern-
ment would have been forced to reckon with a wave of 
releases of defendants from the Ergenekon trials and 
a subsequent resurgence of military power. It would 
also have had to answer directly to the Kurds for the 
frequently constitutionally questionable judgements 
in the KCK trials. The retention of the special courts 
for current trials related to crimes against the State 
 In many cases, this charge 
rested solely on the extremely wide definition of ter-
rorism under Turkish law, which is why the request to 
terminate the proceedings constitutes a core element 
of the Turkish State’s current negotiations with the PKK. 
 
http://www.afpc.org/files/getContentPostAttachment/220 
(accessed 21 November 2013). 
67  Statement by the Journalists and Writers Foundation 
(GYV) in the Zaman newspaper, published on 14 August 2013. 
68  Cf. Hüseyin Gülerce in the pro-movement daily Zaman, 
published on 4 July 2012. 
69  The figure according to official information from the 
Turkish Ministry of Justice, quoted in Fikret İlkiz, “KCK Cases 
and the Judiciary Mechanism”, Perspectives – Political Analysis 
and Commentary from Turkey, no. 2 (October 2012): 41–5. 
reduces pressure on the government in both areas, 
instead directing this towards the Gülen movement 
and ensuring it is portrayed as the key impediment 
on the path to democratisation. Meanwhile, the gov-
ernment has delegated new cases concerning crimes 
against the State to regional senior criminal courts, 
which protects them against further action by the 
Gülen network’s cliques within the police force and 
the judiciary. 
The sudden adoption by Gülen’s supporters of a 
confrontational stance towards the government came 
as a complete surprise to outsiders because, however 
strongly a social force is anchored in the bureaucratic 
system, it cannot really pose a threat to the govern-
ment without military backing. As a result, the move-
ment’s political suicide is already being predicted.70
On the one hand, the large popularity it has en-
joyed in the last decade has resulted in the expansion 
of its financial, economic and political options, and 
the expectations of its supporters have increased sim-
ultaneously in an ideational and financial respect. 
Economic rent-seeking has also developed, which is 
directed at bureaucratic positions, the assignment of 
government orders, the designation of building plots 
and the state funding of formerly privately initiated 
educational institutions at home and abroad. 
 
There are three potential reasons why the movement 
has abandoned its former political restraint and 
caution. 
Secondly, the movement’s increased expectation of 
“return” is set against fears of the demise of Fethullah 
Gülen, who is in poor health and without whom the 
organisation threatens to collapse. Simultaneously, 
the network’s expansion abroad is stagnating. In cen-
tral Asian countries, the initially sizeable leeway ac-
corded by some governments to the movement was 
curtailed, while, in the Middle East, the Gülen com-
munity faces an increasing radicalisation of its reli-
gious environment, which hampers the dissemination 
of its version of a moderate Islam.71
Thirdly, the movement had already suffered a set-
back as regards Turkey’s security bureaucracy prior to 
the outbreak of open conflict with the government. In 
 
 
70  Yüksel Taşkın, “The Gülenists, a Movement between Reli-
gious Nationalism and Transnational Dynamics” (Turkish), 
Birikim 282 (October 2012): 31. 
71  Bayram Balcı, “The Development of the Fethullah Gülen 
Community in Central Asia, the USA and Europe” (Turkish), 
Birikim 282 (October 2012): 52–66, and personal communi-
cation with journalist Ali Topuz in Istanbul on 11 September 
2013. 
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March 2011, the government transferred Turkey’s 
largest monitoring system (GES), which had, until 
then, been controlled by the Office of the General 
Staff, to the National Intelligence Service (MİT). As a 
result, the weakening of the military was not accom-
panied by a strengthening of the police force, in 
which Gülen’s supporters are particularly well organ-
ised, but instead benefited the intelligence service, 
controlled by Erdoğan.72
By announcing the closure of all establishments 
offering revision courses, one of the Gülen move-
ment’s principal sources of income, in September and 
October 2013, the government stepped up pressure 
on the network a further notch. As this measure was 
implemented without any accompanying educational 
reform,
 The previous year, the leader-
ship of the MİT had been transferred to Hakan Fidan, 
the undersecretary responsible for the Intelligence 
Agency, who, in February 2012, was forced to answer 
to the Special Court of Istanbul on suspicion of “col-
laboration”. 
73 it was intended explicitly to weaken the 
movement. This demonstrates that the government 
has clearly prevailed in its dispute with the Gülen 
movement. A political opportunity for the latter could 
only arise in the event of a leadership change within 
the AKP, or if the party becomes divided, in the case 
of a poor showing at the local elections on 30 March 
2014, for instance.74
 
 However, there are no signs of 
this to date. 
 
 
72  Murat Yetkin in the newspaper Radikal, published on 
8 March 2011. 
73  According to a statement by the former Chairman of 
the Turkish Education Council (TTK) Ziya Selçuk in the daily 
newspaper Taraf, published on 28 October 2013. 
74  Ergün Yıldırım in the weekly newspaper Agos, published 
on 15 August 2013. 
 SWP Berlin 
Is the Fethullah Gülen Movement Overstretching Itself? 
January 2014 
 
 
 
22 
The Fethullah Gülen Movement as International Player 
 
The Movement in the USA 
In the USA, the image enjoyed by Fethullah Gülen and 
his movement is, despite several setbacks, far more 
positive than his reputation in Turkey or Germany. A 
semi-official statement about his person notes: “Gülen 
preaches a distinctly Turkish brand of Islam that con-
demns terrorism, promotes interfaith dialogue and 
cross-cultural understanding, and can function in con-
cert with secular democratic mechanisms and modern 
economic and technological modes of living.”75 In 
2011, the East West Institute76 nominated Fethullah 
Gülen as the recipient of its annual Peacebuilding 
Award. The laudatory speeches were made by Kofi 
Annan and two former US Secretaries of State, James 
Baker and Madeleine Albright.77
In the USA, Gülen’s followers are involved in a 
broad spectrum of topics and fields of activity, rang-
ing from schools, media enterprises, think tanks
 
78 
and lobby groups to management consultancies and 
other commercial enterprises. The Turkic American 
Alliance, which provides not only immigrants from 
Turkey, but also those from central Asian Turkic States 
and the Balkan States with a platform, acts as the 
parent organisation for pro-Gülen institutions.79
 
75  Jim Zanotti, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS 
Report for Congress R41368 (Washington: Congressional 
Research Service, 27 April 2012), 9. 
 These 
are the regions in which Gülen’s now global educa-
tional initiatives took hold after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain. Even experts are no longer able to gain a com-
plete overview of the movement’s extensive network 
in the USA. In view of the sheer extent of its activities, 
the Turkish-French researcher Bayram Balcı, who 
specialises in Gülen organisations in Central Asia, the 
76  Founded as the Institute for East West Security Studies. 
77  Video excerpts from the tributes paid by the three 
speakers can be viewed at http://www.firstpost.com/topic/ 
perosn/madeleine-k-albright-about-fethulla-Gulen-video-
HADHIEGtfkg-1993-1.html (accessed 13 December 2012). 
78  These include, for example, the Rethink Institute in 
Washington, http://www.rethinkinstitute.org (accessed 
17 November 2013). 
79  See the organisation’s internet presence, the Rumi Forum, 
Rumi Forum Corporate Video, http://turkicamericanalliance.org/ 
about-taa/ (accessed 15 December 2012). 
United States and Europe, writes: “The heart of the 
movement now beats in the USA.”80
Immediately after Gülen’s relocation to America 
in 1999, his US-based supporters initiated an intensive 
campaign for interfaith dialogue, and founded the 
“Rumi Forum” in Washington in the same year. The 
forum’s introductory video includes former US Presi-
dent Bill Clinton and the internationally established 
expert on Islamic Studies, John Esposito.
 
81
Gülen did not explore the Islamic mystics (Sufis) in 
his writings until the nineties, when he was over fifty 
years old.
 Its name 
references the Anatolian mystic Jalāl ad-Dīn Muham-
mad Rūmī (Dschalal ad-Din ar-Rumi), who abandoned 
orthodox scholarship in favour of a direct experience 
of God. 
82
Left- and right-wing critics of the movement in Tur-
key point to the fact that Gülen had started adopting a 
pro-US position in concrete questions of foreign policy 
prior to his relocation to the USA, which clashed with 
the emphatically negative picture he painted of the 
 In accordance with the teachings of the 
Nakşibendiye Order, he had previously distanced him-
self from the individual search for God as taught by 
the Sufis, and also negated the line of thought which 
suggested a hidden meaning to the Koran different to 
its patent, literal meaning, with the result that he 
opposed the often attendant relativisation of religious 
rules regarding cult and lifestyle. However, the fo-
rum’s eponym advocates precisely this interpretation. 
As a result, Gülen’s reference to Rumi appears instru-
mental and pragmatic and is probably due in large 
part to the positive image enjoyed by Islamic mysti-
cism in the USA as opposed to the more critically 
viewed orthodoxy. In the USA, Gülen’s movement has 
succeeded in gaining the support of an entire series 
of prominent academics, and continues to bask in the 
approval of part of the political elite. 
 
80  Balcı, “The Development of the Fethullah Gülen Commu-
nity” (see note 71), 58. 
81  Rumi Forum, Rumi Forum Corporate Video, http://vimeo.com/ 
moogaloop.swf?clip_id=7396904&amp (accessed 25 December 
2012). 
82  Mustafa Gökçek, quoted in Michel, “The Theological Di-
mension of the Thought of M. Fethullah Gülen” (see note 17), 
62. 
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West at the time. They recall the fact that, in the nine-
ties, the USA encouraged Turkey to expand its influ-
ence in the former Soviet areas of Central Asia, and 
insinuate that the Gülen community received sub-
stantial support from the CIA when establishing its 
schools in Central Asia.83 In the eighties and nineties, 
Islamically-oriented circles in Turkey found it difficult 
to comprehend why Gülen justified the Turkish and 
American support of Saddam Hussein against Shiite 
Iran on the one hand, and America’s bombing of Iraq 
in the Gulf War in 1991 on the other. They also sug-
gest the movement’s possible political instrumentali-
sation by Washington.84 In recent times, it is striking 
that Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MİT) and 
its boss Hakan Fidan have become problematic both 
in the eyes of the Gülen movement and for parts of the 
political public in the USA. On 9 October 2013, Fidan 
was accused by the Wall Street Journal of arming 
jihadists in Syria and compromising US interests.85 
A few days later, the Washington Post wrote that the 
MİT under Fidan had allegedly revealed the identity 
of Israeli intelligence officers to Iran.86 And shortly 
thereafter, the Financial Times questioned Turkey’s 
loyalty to the alliance, citing Fidan as one reason for 
this.87 Within Turkey, this criticism of the head of the 
Intelligence Agency is interpreted as a direct attack on 
the Erdoğan government.88
 
83  According to the pro-PKK daily newspaper Yeni Özgür 
Politika on 4 March 2009, http://www.kalemlervekiliclar.com/ 
Thread-Gulen-okullarinin-finansoru-kim (accessed 10 Decem-
ber 2012). 
 American religious scholar 
Helen Rose Ebaugh, whose eminently positive book 
about the movement was recently published in Ger-
84  Cf. Ali Bulaç in the former daily newspaper Vahdet, 11 Feb-
ruary 1991, documented in http://www.n-f-k.com/nfkforum/ 
index.php?/topic/14327-fethullah-gulen-hareketi-ve-darbeler/ 
(accessed 29 November 2012). 
85  Adam Entous and Joe Parkinson, “Turkey’s Spymaster 
Plots Own Course on Syria”, The Wall Street Journal, 10 October 
2013. 
86  David Ignatius, “Turkey Blows Israel’s Cover for Iranian 
Spy Rings”, The Washington Post, 17 October 2013. 
87  Daniel Dombey, “Doubts Rise over Turkey’s Ties to the 
West”, Financial Times, 20 October 2013. 
88  The article refers to a campaign against Erdoğan, which 
is only comprehensible against the background of an earlier 
article in The Wall Street Journal. Here, Obama’s Middle East 
strategy is declared a failure. Instead of relying on political 
collaborations with moderate Islamic parties and groups like 
the AKP and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, it would be 
more advisable to support the secular powers in these coun-
tries, Walter Russel Mead, “The Failed Grand Strategy in the 
Middle East”, The Wall Street Journal, 24 August 2013. 
man, also acknowledges an at least partial overlap of 
the aims of the Gülen network and US interests.89
The positive public reception enjoyed by the move-
ment in the USA, however, should, in all likelihood, be 
ascribed instead to the higher prevalence of religiosity 
in America in comparison with Europe, and to the 
more pronounced appreciation of religion’s social role. 
Nevertheless, the movement’s positive image has 
started showing cracks. This can be attributed primari-
ly to three developments.
 
90
Firstly, the increasing references to Islamic identity, 
Ottoman history and Muslim solidarity within the 
rhetoric of the Turkish ruling party in recent years, 
whose earlier close ties with the Gülen movement 
have not been forgotten. In particular, the tensions 
between Turkey and Israel fuelled suspicion against 
the long-term aims of moderate Turkish Muslims as 
a whole in the USA. 
 
In addition, the movement’s reputation was also 
dealt a serious blow by reports that sections of the 
Turkish police force and judiciary were infiltrated by 
Gülen supporters. This information reinforced doubts 
regarding the sincerity of the movement’s figurehead, 
the innocence of his teachings and the transparency 
of the entire movement. 
A lack of transparency was the byword when the so-
called Charter Schools close to the movement, and 
their governance by commercial enterprises attracted 
the attention of the media. Over 120 such “contract 
schools” are ascribed to the Gülen movement.91 Criti-
cism was sparked by the almost exclusive employment 
of Turkish teaching staff at these establishments, 
obscure business practices and the initial categorical 
denial of any connection between the schools and 
Fethullah Gülen.92
 
89  Helen Rose Ebaugh, The Gülen Movement: An Empirical Study, 
Freiburg 2012. In an interview with the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
the author states: “Here, I agree with the former US Secre-
taries of State James Baker and Madeleine Albright and the 
ex-CIA man Graham Fuller. They state that we must support 
movements like this, as they are an alternative to fundamen-
talism”, in “‘An Alternative to Fundamentalism’. Sociologist 
of Religion Helen Rose Ebaugh Views the Gülen Movement as 
an Opportunity for the West” (German), Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
(online), 21 June 2010, http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/ 
eine-alternative-zum-fundamentalismus-1.6182405 (accessed 
20 November 2013). 
 
90  Cf. Balcı, “The Development of the Fethullah Gülen Com-
munity” (see note 71), 59ff. 
91  Zanotti, Turkey (see note 75), p. 9. 
92  Sharon Higgins, “Largest Charter Network in U.S.: Schools 
Tied to Turkey”, The Washington Post (online), 27 March 2012. 
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The Fethullah Gülen Movement within 
Europe’s Turkish-Muslim Diaspora 
Within Western European societies, those involved 
in the Gülen movement face considerably different 
challenges than those prevailing in the USA on the 
one hand and in central Asian or Balkan states on 
the other. A Muslim-Turkish middle class is currently 
establishing itself in the USA, using tools such as inter-
faith dialogue, the operation of schools (transferred to 
it by the state authorities) and entrepreneurial net-
works. This is concomitantly allowing it to strengthen 
the movement’s global position. The attention of 
Gülen supporters in the USA is focused on the multi-
cultural American majority society and, indirectly, 
on the global public. In central Asian countries and 
Balkan states, the movement’s activities are directed 
at Muslim majority societies or larger Muslim groups 
within the population. Here, it advocates a specific 
form of Muslim identity and propagates the Turkish 
language and culture. In the USA, Central Asia and the 
Balkans, then, the Gülen movement acts as a Turkish-
Muslim pioneer. Players are either, as in Central Asia, 
predominantly “delegates” from Turkey or representa-
tives of the first generation of immigrants who were 
already part of the movement in their native coun-
tries. In all cases, the Gülen network is the first sus-
tainable non-state Turkish-(Muslim) organisation. 
By contrast, the Gülen movement is a latecomer to 
Western European countries. It only entered the pub-
lic spotlight a good thirty years after other Turkish-
Muslim associations with which it shares its chief 
target group: immigrants of Turkish origin. In Europe, 
the movement can, as is the case in Turkey, be traced 
back to study groups focusing on the writings of Said-i 
Nursi,93
However, despite its late arrival in Western Europe 
and notwithstanding the fact that the proverbial cake 
 which were, however, not particularly wide-
spread as a result of labour immigrants’ social struc-
tures. In order to achieve Gülen’s objective of creating 
a Muslim elite via a self-organised system of secular 
education, a class of Turkish entrepreneurs and free-
lancers able to finance the necessary institutions was 
required on the one hand, and a critical mass of young 
people with a command of the respective local lan-
guages on the other. As a result, the existence of a 
second and third generation of immigrants was a pre-
requisite in order to implement Gülen’s ideas. 
 
93  Martin van Bruinessen, “Holland and the Gülen Move-
ment” (Turkish), Birikim 282 (October 2012): 69ff. 
appeared already completely shared out, the Gülen 
movement spread its wings there very quickly. Accord-
ing to some researchers, it is currently deemed the 
most influential of the Turkish communities in almost 
all countries in the region.94
The Gülen movement’s stance towards other 
Turkish-Muslim organisations 
 What are the grounds for 
this success? 
Turkish labour migration to Europe began in Ger-
many, where the first Turkish-Muslim organisations 
were also founded. In contrast to countries like 
Greece, the Turkish State made no agreement with the 
Federal Republic regarding the provision of religious 
guidance for its citizens. 1973 saw the establishment 
of the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres (VIKZ) 
in Cologne, an amalgamation of mosque communities 
which follow the tradition of the Nakşibendi sheikh 
Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888–1959). During the 
decades of rigid republican laicism, Tunahan was the 
most successful initiator of an underground Koran 
study movement, which maintained its intake with 
strategies including the establishment of school board-
ing houses and student residences. Cologne also saw 
the constitution of the Millî Görüş movement (today 
IGMG) in 1975, which is closely connected to the his-
tory of the Islamic parties around Necmettin Erbakan. 
At the time, the Turkish Republic viewed both move-
ments as an expression of “religious reaction”. Re-
pressing this “reaction” overseas was the prime moti-
vation for the establishment of the state-controlled 
Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DİTİB) in 
Cologne in 1984. These large-scale Turkish-Muslim 
organisations vie for believers in the European host 
countries, as well as for mosque communities, Koran 
students and clients for their affiliated economic 
enterprises, which include travel agencies for pilgrim-
ages and funeral directors. They are also in competi-
tion as far as the social and political representation 
of the religious rights of Muslims are concerned, be it 
public debates regarding the approval of the headscarf 
at school and at the workplace, the introduction of 
Islamic religious instruction, permission for ritual 
 
94  Balcı, “The Development of the Fethullah Gülen Commu-
nity” (see note 71), 63. Johan Leman has supported this with 
figures for the educational sector in Belgium, “The Flexible 
and Multilayered Character of the ‘Hizmet’ (Social Service) 
Movement in Immigration: A Case Study from Belgium”, in 
Mapping the Gülen Movement, ed. Çelik (see note 17), 89. 
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slaughter or the construction of cemeteries and 
mosques. 
The Gülen movement deliberately eschews all these 
activities by Turkish-Islamic associations and organisa-
tions, which are repeatedly criticised as underscoring 
tendencies towards seclusion and the creation of par-
allel societies. Instead of organising Koran classes, the 
movement concentrates on the institution of revision 
courses designed to support under-achieving pupils. 
Instead of concerning itself with the construction 
and running of mosques, it dedicates itself to the 
establishment of private schools, preferably grammar 
schools. Instead of advocating the unhindered dis-
play of Islamic symbols in public (headscarf, minaret, 
Muslim holidays), it opens centres promoting inter-
cultural dialogue. And instead of devoting itself to 
the political mobilisation of immigrants, frequently 
underprivileged in terms of economic situation and 
education, it initiates entrepreneur’s associations and 
makes every effort to establish contact with the eco-
nomic, political and cultural elites of the respective 
host countries. Viewed as a whole, this policy mirrors 
the familiar strategy applied by the Gülen movement 
in Turkey, characterised as it is by a rejection of any 
direct politicisation of religion and aimed instead at 
the grooming of a devout elite via secular education. 
In addition, the Gülen movement seeks no coopera-
tion or even contact with other Muslim associations 
active in Europe. In Germany, it is represented neither 
in the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD), 
nor in the German Islamic Council (IRD). It also has no 
involvement in the Coordinating Council of Muslims 
(KRM), which was established as a nationwide union 
of the DİTİB, IRD, ZMD and VIKZ in 2007, and avoids 
participation in the German Islam Conference (DIK). 
Instead, initiatives close to Gülen set great store by 
dialogue and cooperation with the churches. These 
efforts, coupled with the absence of any endeavours to 
strengthen Muslims’ public presence in the host coun-
tries, have occasionally resulted in the Gülen move-
ment being accused of displaying “Christianising ten-
dencies”.95 Although researchers sympathetic to the 
movement praise its active citizenship in the host 
countries, they concurrently warn it against cham-
pioning the immigrants’ assimilation.96
 
95  Balcı, “The Development of the Fethullah Gülen Commu-
nity” (see note 
 
71), 66. 
96  Leman, “The Flexible and Multilayered Character of the 
‘Hizmet’ Movement” (see note 94), 97. 
In Germany, criticism related to precisely this 
advice could be targeted at the “Dialogue” grammar 
school in Cologne, a peerless example of the educa-
tional activities in North Rhine-Westphalia inspired 
by Gülen, for offering Catholic and Protestant reli-
gious education, but no Islamic instruction.97 Indeed, 
all schools inspired by Gülen’s teachings in this fed-
eral state forgo the inclusion of Islamic instruction 
in their curricula, which would actually be possible 
under the North Rhine-Westphalia Education Act.98
The Gülen movement’s appeal for the 
Turkish-Muslim diaspora 
 
The fact that part-time teachers of German origin are 
in the majority at these schools in Germany, unlike in 
the USA, Central Asia or the Balkan States, could also 
encourage similar criticism by Muslims. 
For decades, Turkish immigrants in Europe ensured 
that their children maintained their Turkish-Muslim 
identity by sending their offspring to schools in Tur-
key. The fact that many are now choosing to tread 
the path prepared by Nursi and Gülen, namely trust-
ing that the acquisition of secular knowledge will 
strengthen their children’s religious identity, can 
justifiably be termed “revolutionary”.99
The Gülen movement’s doctrine that Islam also 
demands and justifies knowledge acquisition and 
transfer is used by Turkish immigrants as a means of 
legitimising their quest for social advancement. The 
following figures illustrate the resulting dynamic:
 
100
 
97  Seyitahmed Tokmak, “The Educational Concept of Schools 
within the Gülen Movement: An Example from North Rhine-
Westphalia” (German), in Die Gülen-Bewegung: zwischen Predigt 
und Praxis, ed. Ursula Boos-Nünning et al. (Münster, 2011),  
59–66, here 61. 
 
today, over 60 educational institutions inspired by 
Gülen exist in North Rhine-Westphalia alone, with 
more than 300 in Germany as a whole. These insti-
tutions have founded numerous subsidiaries or 
branches in the Rhine-Ruhr metropolises. In Cologne, 
the educational institution Academy e.V. boasts 
seven branches and provided extracurricular revision 
courses to approximately 1,050 pupils in 2011. The 
98  Bekim Agai, “The Work of the Gülen Movement in North 
Rhine-Westphalia: Players, Ideas, Perceptions” (German), in 
Die Gülen-Bewegung: zwischen Predigt und Praxis, ed. Boos-Nünning 
et al. (see note 97), 29–58, here 40. 
99  Ibid., 34. 
100  Ibid., 29–36. 
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revision courses are the fruits of the first phase of the 
Gülen movement’s educational campaign targeted 
specifically at the European diaspora. The establish-
ment of schools, primarily private grammar schools, 
forms the second phase. In 2011, three private 
schools inspired by Gülen existed in NRW, with 24 
in Germany as a whole the same year. 
The considerable success enjoyed by the educa-
tional initiative in Germany established by Gülen and 
maintained by devout Muslims is certainly due, in 
part, to the German education system’s comparative 
failure to ensure that children from migrant back-
grounds achieve higher educational qualifications. At 
the aforementioned “Dialogue” grammar school in 
Cologne, just 10 per cent of pupils come from families 
in which at least one parent graduated from a gram-
mar school (or equivalent institution). In consequence, 
the schools run by the Gülen movement can be viewed 
as educational self-help tools for immigrants, which 
also precipitate a successful shift in their educational 
orientation. 
The space accorded to the Turkish language, cul-
ture and identity in terms of educational work differs 
both in various European countries and across Ger-
many’s federal states. In Belgium, the movement 
avoids emphasising Turkish nationality almost en-
tirely, in contrast to in other states in Central Asia, the 
Balkans and Africa. The Turkish flag is not displayed 
in schools in Belgium, and Turkish does not form part 
of the curriculum. There, schools related to the move-
ment have made themselves accessible to other immi-
grant groups, and also endeavour to attract pupils 
of Belgian origin.101 In Germany, the schools are also 
stepping up efforts to appeal to parents of both other 
immigration backgrounds and those of German 
origin. In Stuttgart, Turkish is dispensed with, while 
in Berlin it is a second foreign language.102
 
101  Leman, “The Flexible and Multilayered Character of the 
‘Hizmet’ Movement” (see note 
 The in-
creasing importance of this language is now also 
being underscored in NRW. The virtually worldwide 
campaign for the promotion of Turkish, widely known 
as the Turkish Language Olympiads, operates in Ger-
many under the name of “German-Turkish Cultural 
Olympiads”, a label designed to accommodate the dis-
course on integration. In the Netherlands, the event 
was accorded an environmentally-friendly slant and 
altered to the “Environmental Olympiads”. 
94), passim. 
102  Jochen Thies, We Are Part of this Society: Insights into the 
Gülen Movement’s Educational Initiatives (Freiburg i. Br., 2013), 
133. 
However, despite all its educational efforts and 
initiatives to foster dialogue, the Gülen movement 
remains as controversial in Europe as it is in Turkey. 
There are three fundamental reasons for this. 
For one thing, the political climate has changed 
and, with it, the paradigms for discussion regarding 
labour migration to Europe and its ramifications. 
One indication of this is the shift in the terms used 
to define the “problem group” over the years. From 
“guest workers” (Gastarbeiter) in the 1960s and 70s to 
“Turks” in the 80s and 90s and now, since the 2000s, 
“Muslims”, the terms used to describe this ethnic 
minority have oscillated for decades.103 In the public 
debate on integration and Islam, the dichotomy 
between the “liberal principles of the host society” 
and the “illiberal value systems of the Muslim immi-
grants” is now firmly established.104
Secondly, the dispute surrounding the Gülen move-
ment in Europe is a direct reflection of the political 
squabbles in Turkey, where the movement is custom-
arily viewed as a politically unified power and per-
ceived in a hostile manner by unwaveringly secular 
forces, the extreme left and the large majority of 
Alevis.
 
105
Thirdly, players within the Gülen movement have 
also been unable to deal with questions regarding the 
organisation’s internal cohesion in a relaxed manner 
in Europe either. As in Turkey and the USA, so in 
Europe: when the question of the connection between 
the respective institutions, Fethullah Gülen and his 
network arises, the representatives of establishments 
linked to Gülen initially deny any ties to the latter 
and only admit that Gülen is revered as their inspi-
ration after lengthy probing. However, any links 
between the individual initiatives are subsequently 
usually negated.
 This also results in parts of Gülen’s earlier 
works being drawn on rather summarily in order 
to highlight the “real intentions” of the supporters 
currently active in his name in Europe. 
106
 
103  Martin van Bruinessen describes this shift as a pan-Euro-
pean phenomenon in After Van Gogh: Roots of Anti-Muslim Rage, 
paper presented at the workshop “Public Debates about Islam 
in Europe. How and Why ‘Immigrants’ Became ‘Muslims’” 
(Florence/Montecatini Terme: European University Institute, 
22–26 March 2006). 
 Additionally, the fact that pro-
104  Cf. Anne Schönfeld, “Muslim Loyalty Put to the Test. 
The Reception of the Cartoon Controversy in Germany”, in 
Religion, Identity and Politics: Germany and Turkey in Interaction, 
ed. Haldun Gülalp and Günter Seufert (London, 2013), 87–99. 
105  Van Bruinessen, “Holland and the Gülen Movement” 
(see note 93), 69. 
106  Ibid., 68. 
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Gülen academics accept the movement’s self-
presentation as a purely loosely connected structure 
does little to placate critics, who, for their part, 
assume the existence of a perfectly functioning, 
hierarchical leadership and control mechanism.107
 
 
 
 
107  See for example Serap Çileli, “Fethullah Gülen, Wolf 
in Sheep’s Clothing” (German), cileli.de, 13 February 2013, 
http://www.cileli.de/2013/02/fethullah-guelen-wolf-im-
schafspelz/ (accessed 20 December 2013). 
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Gülen and His Supporters: Attempting a Definition 
 
NGO Network, Religious Community or 
Political Secret Society? 
As a reaction to criticism regarding a lack of trans-
parency, the Gülen movement started to concede that 
it was more than merely a series of co-existing insti-
tutions approximately two years ago. Meanwhile, it 
describes itself as a “society” in international publica-
tions, simultaneously rejecting the use of the term 
“community/cemaat”. The self-definition as a society 
serves two purposes: firstly, the movement wishes to 
imply that there is no fixed membership (and, with 
this, no firm inner structure), and no exterior demar-
cation. Secondly, it wishes to create the impression that 
its own (ethical and political) orientation is aligned 
entirely with the attitudes in mainstream Turkish 
society and that it represents and is incorporated with-
in the same.108 The current image projected by one of 
the network’s institutions, which strongly rejects the 
suggestion that it pursues self-serving political goals, 
is one of a “democratic, civil society movement.”109
However, the movement simultaneously makes no 
pretence of the fact that its civil society activities have 
a religious motivation. The corresponding thoughts 
of its spiritus rector are stated openly, and it is no secret 
that the large majority of volunteers working within 
schools and associations and the teachers who are 
members of the movement view their educational 
commitment as godly actions per se.
 
Religion is referred to in neither of the two key docu-
ments listed. In fact, proselytising or even religious 
instruction play no part in the movement’s official 
institutions. 
110
 
108  Ekrem Dumanlı, “Society, Not Community!”, Turkish 
Review 2, no. 2 (19 March 2012): 8–11. 
 At the same 
time, it seems fair to state that the activists are filled 
109  Statement by the Journalists and Writers Foundation 
(GYV) in the Zaman newspaper, published on 14 August 2013. 
110  “Consequently, even physics lessons become part of the 
struggle against the Ğāhiliya (ignorance of God), the schools 
become the actual houses of prayer and the teacher the core 
figure of the faith”, Tobias Specker, “Fethullah Gülen: An In-
troduction” (German), in Boos-Nünning et al., Die Gülen-Bewe-
gung: zwischen Predigt und Praxis (see note 97), 15–28, here  
22–23. 
with a strong sense of affiliation towards the move-
ment and loyalty towards it. Moreover, the existence of 
a common habitus among Gülen’s supporters cannot 
be overlooked. 
Nonetheless, where do these characteristics evolve? 
The movement’s residential communities are the 
usual answer to this question, which date back to the 
early days of Gülen’s ministry and are known as “light-
houses”. Their daily routine is characterised by the 
strict performance of ritual prayers, repetitive remem-
brance of God, reading the Koran and studying Gülen’s 
writings. These activities are complemented by social 
control mechanisms designed to influence the activ-
ists’ behaviour, such as group discussions and the im-
perative regarding the mutual assumption of respon-
sibility for the actions of the residential community’s 
other members. All this results in a stabilisation of 
intellectual, emotional and behavioural tendencies 
which generate the aforementioned habitus.111 Gülen 
himself views the residential communities as the 
dynamic core of his religious community. According 
to him, the sum total of the energy they generate 
should be directed at further growth and – as the ulti-
mate goal – at the moral reform of society, which, in 
Gülen’s eyes, is coextensive with the civil society re-
Islamisation of Muslim countries. To transform the 
individual into a “soldier of light” who strives to 
achieve this goal with all his might, Gülen believes 
it necessary to fill the “empty heads” of a “generation 
living in accordance with meaningless paradigms” 
with the truths of faith.112
The movement’s supporters are convinced that they 
are fulfilling a divine mandate made manifest, and 
refer in the process to a saying by the Prophet (hadith) 
which constituted his response when pressed on the 
subject of his most loyal believers: “My sincere believ-
 
 
111  For a groundbreaking description and analysis of life in 
the movement’s communes in Germany, see Kristina Dohrn, 
Ethics and Practice in Communes Operated by the Gülen Movement 
(German) (Berlin: Weißensee-Verlag, due for publication in 
2014). 
112  Fethullah Gülen, “The Nature and Mission of the Light-
houses” (Turkish), fgulen.com (=  o fficial Gülen website), 27 
September 2001, http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/2628/3/ 
(accessed 20 November 2013). 
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ers are not here with me. They are the ones who will 
come when Islam is under attack from within and 
without; they will come forward and secure the mes-
sage of God with moral virtue and exemplary behav-
iour. They are the longed-for ones.”113 As a result, 
Gülen is regarded by his supporters as the anticipated 
renewer of faith,114 and many consider his knowledge 
and preaching an expression of divine inspiration.115
The inner structure of the religious community can 
be viewed as a series of concentric circles.
 
116 The inner-
most circle, or core of the movement, whose older 
members (abi = elder brother) think along strongly 
conservative-national lines and avoid public political 
debate are connected directly with Fethullah Gülen. 
Its younger members, by contrast, behave in a far 
more outspoken and self-assertive manner, probably 
also because they are usually employed in the move-
ment’s profit-making institutions. Among these are 
Ekrem Dumanlı, editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper 
Zaman, Mustafa Yeşil, President of the Journalists 
and Writers Foundation, and Rıza Nur Meral, CEO of 
TUSKON.117
 
113  M. Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen 
Movement (Oxford, 2013), 71. 
 The older members fill the upper echelons 
of the community’s leadership clique, full time and on 
fixed salaries, and engage increasingly in controversial 
strategic debates with the younger representatives of 
this inner circle. The second circle consists of regional 
leaders who are appointed by the core of the move-
ment. They are also responsible for the conceptualisa-
tion and development of new projects and institu-
tions. As is the case in Turkish bureaucracy as a whole, 
the movement’s trademark organisational principles 
include the regular rotation of regional leaders and 
monitoring of their activities. The third and largest 
circle is formed of all those who are employed by 
or sympathisers of the Gülen network’s institutions. 
While Hakan Yavuz sees seamless transitions from 
supporter to permanently integrated member at the 
edge of the movement, where individual freedom of 
decision is possible, he comments that the two inner 
circles are characterised by a “military-like discipline”. 
114  Canlı, “A Delicate Connection” (see note 27), 89. 
115  Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment (see note 113), 75. 
116  Cf. for the following ibid., 86f. See also Dohrn, Ethics and 
Practice in Communes Operated by the Gülen Movement (see note 111), 
65–70. A classification differentiated by discourse can be 
found in Pim Valkenberg’s work (who, for his part, refers 
to Bekim Agai), “The Intellectual Dimension of the Hizmet 
Movement”, in Mapping the Gülen Movement, ed. Çelik (see 
note 17), 33–4. 
117  Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment (see note 113), 86. 
However, he goes on to remark that, in recent years, 
decision-making authority has shifted increasingly to 
regional level, this triggered by the movement’s rapid 
growth and geographical expansion. As far as regional 
leaders are concerned, Yavuz concludes: “They have 
turned into virtual “baron-like” leaders rather than 
abis due to their control of huge funds and properties, 
including schools.118
According to this, the Gülen movement constitutes 
a hierarchically-structured, religious community with 
a civil society mission and a pronounced politically 
creative drive. Its growth and social dynamic results 
from the tension between the desire to maintain a 
given religious identity and the striving for social ad-
vancement in a modern society. Its socio-political posi-
tions emanate from the forced secularisation and con-
comitant social marginalisation of pious members 
of the Turkish Republic on the one hand and a self-
sought secularisation of the mindscapes of its mem-
bers on the other. 
 
The movement’s originally strict hierarchy is in-
creasingly weakened, something which cannot only 
be attributed to the generation shift. Firstly, the move-
ment has grown exceedingly swiftly and expanded to 
encompass a continually rising number of countries. 
This development went hand in hand with the integra-
tion of its supporters in a vast array of different pro-
fessions and economic connections. Widely different 
economic and political interests finds increasingly 
strong expression in the wake of this trend. The move-
ment’s cohesion would be unthinkable without its 
charismatic leader. However, the cohesion is secured 
by the benefits offered by the movement to its mem-
bers in the form of its resources. Moreover, the politi-
cal and economic attacks to which the movement in 
Turkey is subjected and the socio-political criticism 
it is experiencing in the USA and Europe are factors 
which cause its members to bond more strongly time 
and again. These circumstances explain why, in Tur-
key, activists within the movement’s educational 
institutions and pro-Gülen entrepreneurs, both of 
whom have no interest in conflicts with the govern-
ment, remain loyal to the movement’s networks with-
in the bureaucracy which seek direct political influ-
 
118  Ibid., p. 87. The creation of such centres of power within 
the police force, which escape the control of the community 
leadership, is described by Hanefi Avc ı in Simons in the Golden 
Horn: Yesterday the State, Today the Gülen Community (Turkish), 
(Ankara, 2010), 557ff. 
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Dealing with the Gülen Movement 
 But what is the significance of this analysis of 
the movement’s structure in terms of its future within 
the European diaspora? And which recommendations 
for action can be formulated for decision-makers in 
Germany? 
The parameters 
All reflections regarding possible ways to deal with 
the movement must proceed from the recognition of 
several fundamental political and social parameters. 
This initially includes the realisation that each and 
every positioning of decision-makers in Germany 
relative to the movement will inevitably influence 
and help shape its further development here. The 
more marked defensive attitudes and the more 
meagre offers of cooperation are, the more likely it is 
that the movement’s central governance and leader-
ship mechanisms will be strengthened. Secondly, it 
is important to recall that all Islamic organisations, 
communities and currents in Germany legitimately 
recruit supporters, and that it is in the interests of 
German society to try and ensure that the young 
Muslim generation is steered along politically mod-
erate paths, not radical ones or those where individu-
als are prepared to resort to violence. Thirdly, every-
thing seems to suggest that the movement in the 
diaspora – unlike in Turkey itself – is not, and can 
never constitute, a significant political factor. The 
Gülen movement in Europe could only pose a “danger”, 
if at all, for individual members who submit to 
authoritarian structures. Meanwhile, nothing points 
to a direct compulsion to remain within these struc-
tures against one’s will as yet. Fourthly, it must be 
emphasised once again that the external civil society 
activities of the movement in Germany, its commit-
ment to the field of education and interfaith and 
intercultural dialogue, serve the integration of immi-
grants within German society – at least objectively. 
It would be absurd to refuse to collaborate with the 
group of Muslims in Germany who carry out integra-
tion work and themselves aspire to social advance-
ment, be this religiously motivated or not. 
 
119  Cf. Ruşen Çakır in the daily newspaper Vatan published 
on 15 and 16 April 2012 and Ali Bayramoğlu in the Vatan 
edition of 23 February 2012. 
Challenges for the Gülen movement in the diaspora 
Against the background of the diaspora, Gülen’s phi-
losophy of adopting modern knowledge, modes of 
action and attitudes, climbing the social ladder and 
thus making an effective contribution to social moral 
reform assumes a new dimension. For one thing, in 
contrast to Turkey, personal social advancement can-
not be linked with the undertaking regarding the con-
quest of the state. For another, and again in contrast 
to Turkey, to concentrate on the preservation of one’s 
traditional religious (Muslim) and national (Turkish) 
identity does not automatically create harmony with 
the majority of the population, but is indeed at least 
partially opposed to the same. As a result, the Turkish-
Muslim diaspora is under pressure to develop a new 
understanding of religious and national identity com-
patible with attitudes prevailing in European societies. 
For the movement’s supporters, this is just as much a 
prerequisite for their individual advancement as the 
reconciliation of their religious world view with its 
scientific equivalent. Gülen’s prompt that service to 
society constitutes a significant form of a lifestyle jus-
tifiable in the eyes of God could prove to be the key 
to resolving the principal conflict of interest between 
Islam and the West both within the European dias-
pora and in the USA, repeatedly emphasised by him 
with insistence in his early writings. In actual fact, 
this is also the direction which the movement’s social 
partners are working towards within the European 
diaspora. For in contrast to Central Asia, the Balkans 
and the USA, where the movement presented itself 
in the guise of Turkish “civil society expatriates” with 
largely prefabricated concepts for schools, universities 
and centres of dialogue and realised these plans with-
in very short periods and frequently without signifi-
cant assistance from the local population, the move-
ment’s activities within the Turkish European dias-
pora are dependent on the immigrants themselves. 
And, in fact, in both the European diaspora and 
in the USA, the political and religious elements of 
Gülen’s teachings which have proved dysfunctional in 
these societies, namely the nationalistic-authoritarian 
praise of Turkish culture, the state-centred, totalitar-
ian aspects of Gülen’s moral doctrines and the tradi-
tional traits of its understanding of Islam, are pushed 
into the background by the movement’s members 
themselves with a meaningful silence. 
So, in the Netherlands, it was noted that the move-
ment did not react to the heightened mistrust which 
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greeted it as a result of the generally higher levels of 
scepticism towards Islam with retreat or even radi-
calisation, but instead demonstrated deeper commit-
ment to the field of secular education. Student homes 
suspected by the public of propagating Islamic teach-
ings were closed, and two schools founded within the 
framework of Dutch school networks, one of which 
was a Montessori school. In Belgium, the movement’s 
educational model of excellence, the Lucerna school, 
regards itself as non-religious and non-denomination-
al.120
If we take note of all these changes, it appears im-
probable that, in the medium-term, the movement’s 
existing central leadership mechanisms would suc-
ceed in prevailing over the interests of the immigrants 
in the event of a conflict of interest. This applies with 
even more pertinence to the era after Fethullah Gülen, 
of whom close sources report, off the record of course, 
that he is confronted with increasingly controversial 
interests within the movement’s inner circle and is 
finding it more and more difficult to maintain bal-
ance and create an atmosphere of compromise. 
 In the Federal Republic of Germany, the move-
ment has not availed itself of its legal right to pre-
scribe a specific pedagogical, religious or ideological 
curriculum for its private schools, instead adopting 
German syllabuses. 
As a result, decision-makers and institutions within 
Germany are usually well advised to collaborate with 
initiatives associated with the Gülen movement. At 
the same time, however, they should insist on internal 
organisational and financial transparency in each 
collaboration and strive to ensure that decisions are 
taken democratically. It is crucial to represent one’s 
own position clearly as far as any debate on content 
is concerned. Nonetheless, a fundamental respect for 
religiosity should also be evident in cases in which 
the depth of the said piety may appear unsettling in 
the eyes of the strongly secularised German society. 
 
120  Leman, “The Flexible and Multilayered Character of the 
‘Hizmet’ Movement in Immigration” (see note 94), passim. 
Abbreviations 
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development 
Party) 
ANAP Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) 
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) 
DİB Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious 
Affairs) 
DIK Deutsche Islamkonferenz (German Islam Conference) 
DİTİB  Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (Turkish-Islamic 
Union for Religious Affairs) 
DP Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) 
DSP Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party) 
DYP Doğru Yol Partisi (Right Path Party) 
FP Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) 
GES Genelkurmay Elektronik Sistemler (Electronic Systems 
of the General Staff) 
GYV Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı (Journalists and Writers 
Foundation) 
HE Halk Evleri (Community Centres) 
HSYK Hâkimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu (Supreme Board 
of Judges and Prosecutors) 
IGMG Islamische GemeinschaftMillî Görüş (Islamic Com-
munity National View) 
IHH İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı 
(Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief) 
IRD Islamrat Deutschland (Islamic Council Germany) 
KCK Koma Civakên Kurdistan (Union of Communities in 
Kurdistan) 
KMD Komünizm Mücadele Derneği (Association for the 
Struggle against Communism) 
KRM Koordinationsrat der Muslime (Coordinating Council 
of Muslims) 
MEB Millî Eğitim Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education) 
MİT Millî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı (National Intelligence 
Organisation) 
MSP Millî Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
PKK Partîya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) 
ÖYM Özel Yetkili Mahkemeler (Court with Extraordinary 
Powers) 
RP Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) 
SP Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) 
TTK Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu (Turkish Education Council) 
TUSKON Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu 
(Confederation of Turkish Businessmen and Indus-
trialists) 
VIKZ Vereinigung Islamischer Kulturzentren (Association of 
Islamic Cultural Centres) (Germany) 
ZMD Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Central 
Council of Muslims in Germany) 
